Contents

1 The Ontology of Language and the Methodology of Linguistics 1
1.1 Introduction 2
1.2 Katz's Argument Against Epistemological Holism 7
1.3 The Infinitude of Language and the Ontology of Linguistics 11
1.4 Conclusion 18

2 Cognitivism and Nominalism in the Philosophy of Linguistics 19
2.1 Introduction 20
2.2 Chomsky, I-language, and the Cognitivist Conception of Linguistics 21
2.3 Devitt's "Linguistic Conception" 33
2.3.1 Objections and Replies 35
2.3.2 Distinguishing Competence from Its Products, and Linguistics from Psycholinguistics 42
2.4 Conclusion 44

3 E-Language and I-Language 45
3.1 Introduction 45
3.2 Motivating the Study of "E-Language" 46
3.2.1 The Role of E-Language in Acquisition Theory 49
3.3 Do Linguists Really Study I-Languages? 56
3.4 Individuating I-Languages 62
3.5 Conclusion 67

4 Language Acquisition and the Explanatory Adequacy Condition 69
4.1 Introduction 69
4.2 Does Pursuit of Explanatory Adequacy Require the Cognitive Conception? 70

Pereplyotchik, David
Psychosyntax

digitalisiert durch:
IDS Basel Bern

4.3 Defusing an Argument for the Cognitivist Conception 73
4.4 In Practice, Do Acquisition Results Constrain Syntactic Theorizing? 79
4.5 Conclusion 82

5 Mental Phrase Markers in Sentence Processing 85
5.1 Introduction 86
5.2 Neurocognitive Findings 89
5.2.1 Summary 95
5.3 The Argument from Structural Priming 96
5.3.1 Summary 100
5.4 The Argument from Garden-Path Effects 101
5.4.1 Summary 110
5.5 The Argument from Filler-Gap Processing 111
5.6 Conclusion 122

6 Two Attempts to Do Without Mental Phrase Markers 125
6.1 Introduction 126
6.2 The "Mostly-Semantics" Models of the Yale School 127
6.2.1 Why the "Mostly-Semantic" Models Don't Work 133
6.3 Brute-Causal Processing 139
6.3.1 Is Language Comprehension an Associationist Process? 140
6.3.2 Is Language Comprehension Simple, Rigid, or Reflex-Like? 143
6.3.3 The Distinction Between Responding and Representing 144
6.3.4 What Does All This Tell Us About the Nature of Mental Representation? 149
6.4 Conclusion 151

7 Representation, Embodiment, and Subpersonal States 153
7.1 Introduction 154
7.2 Theories of Mental Representation 155
7.2.1 Why Take a Stand on Mental Representation? 155
7.2.2 Internalism, Externalism, and the Functional-Role Via Media 156
7.3 The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction 163
7.3.1 Eight Marks of a Subpersonal State 163
7.3.2 Functionalism and Functional-Role Semantics 168
7.4 Computational Psychology, Hardwired Rules, and Embodied Procedural Knowledge 169
7.5 Grammar as a Set of Subpersonal Embodied Procedural Dispositions 176
7.6 Summary and Conclusion 179

8 Computational Models and Psychological Reality 181
8.1 Introduction 182
8.2 The Grammar, First Pass: Context-Free Phrase Structure Grammars 184
8.3 The Algorithm 188
8.3.1 Top-Down Parsing and the Earley Algorithm 189
8.3.2 Bottom-Up Parsing and the CYK Algorithm 195
8.3.3 Left-Corner Parsing 201
8.3.4 Parsing as Deduction 202
8.4 The Oracle: Dealing with Inefficiency and Ambiguity 206
8.4.1 Resource-Based Approaches 208
8.4.2 Frequency-Based Approaches and Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars 211

9 The Psychological Reality of Syntactic Principles 223
9.1 Introduction 224
9.2 Transformational Grammar 225
9.2.1 The Psychological Reality of Transformations and the Derivational Theory of Complexity 227
9.2.2 The Failure of Old-School Transformational Parsers 235
9.3 Augmented Transition Networks 237
9.3.1 Parsing with an ATN 237
9.3.2 The Bearing of ATNs on the Psychological Reality Issue 242
9.3.3 Problems for the ATN Framework 245
9.4 Principles and Parameters in Syntax and Parsing 250
9.4.1 Government and Binding Theory 250
9.4.2 Principles-Based Parsing 257
9.5 Minimalist Grammars 263
9.5.1 Minimalism: The Basics (Features, Merge, Move, and Spell-Out) 263
9.5.2 Parsing with Minimalist Grammars 267
9.5.3 Minimalist Grammar as an Ambiguity Resolution Strategy 272
9.6 Summary and Conclusions 276

References 281