

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vii
Introduction	1
For realism about group agents	2
The historical novelty of our form of group-agent realism	7
Methodological implications, positive and normative	11
Part I. The Logical Possibility of Group Agents	
1. The Conditions of Agency	19
1.1 A basic account of agency	19
1.2 Complications in agency	25
1.3 The idea of group agency	31
2. The Aggregation of Intentional Attitudes	42
2.1 A paradox of majoritarian attitude aggregation	43
2.2 An impossibility result	47
2.3 Escape routes from the impossibility	51
3. The Structure of Group Agents	59
3.1 The organizational structure of a group agent	60
3.2 The supervenience of a group agent	64
3.3 The unmysterious autonomy of the group agent	73
Part II. The Organizational Design of Group Agents	
4. The Epistemic Desideratum	81
4.1 Formulating the epistemic desideratum	82
4.2 Satisfying the epistemic desideratum	86
4.3 Complications	97
5. The Incentive-Compatibility Desideratum	104
5.1 Formulating the incentive-compatibility desideratum	105
5.2 Satisfying the incentive-compatibility desideratum	109
5.3 Two routes to incentive compatibility	124
6. The Control Desideratum	129
6.1 Formulating the control desideratum	129
6.2 Satisfying the control desideratum	136
6.3 Broader lessons	144

Part III. The Normative Status of Group Agents

7. Holding Group Agents Responsible	153
7.1 Fitness to be held responsible	153
7.2 The fitness of group agents to be held responsible	158
7.3 Individual and corporate responsibility	163
8. Personifying Group Agents	170
8.1 The conception of personhood	170
8.2 Group agents as persons	174
8.3 Group persons and respect	178
9. Identifying With Group Agents	186
9.1 Identification and self-identification	186
9.2 Corporate identification and self-identification	191
9.3 Multiple identities	195
<i>References</i>	202
<i>Endnotes</i>	214
<i>General Index</i>	231
<i>Name Index</i>	236