

CONTENTS

PREFACE	xi
CHAPTER I. PROBLEMS CONCERNING INDEFINITES AND ANAPHORA IN LOGICAL SEMANTICS	1
1. Do Indefinites Refer?	4
1.1. Russell's view	5
1.2. Anaphoric pronouns as bound variables	9
1.3. Anaphoric pronouns as picking up a speaker's reference	14
1.4. Anaphoric pronouns as disguised definite descriptions	25
1.5. Anaphoric pronouns and the ambiguity hypothesis	33
1.6. Summary	41
2. Problems with Donkey Sentences	44
2.1. Donkey anaphora as variable binding	47
2.1.1. Egli's proposal	49
2.1.2. Evaluation of Egli's proposal	54
2.1.3. Smaby's proposal	66
2.2. Donkey sentences and pragmatic accounts of anaphora	70
2.3. Donkey anaphora and disguised definite descriptions	71

2.3.1. Pro and contra the uniqueness implication	81
2.3.2. Conditionals	91
2.4. Donkey sentences and the ambiguity hypothesis	99
2.5. Summary	100
3. Donkey Anaphora in Game-Theoretical Semantics	102
Footnotes to Chapter I	119
CHAPTER II. INDEFINITES AS VARIABLES	122
1. The Adaptability of Indefinites, and Lewis on "Adverbs of Quantification"	123
2. Logical Forms for English Texts with Indefinites and Quantifiers	131
3. Semantic Interpretation of Logical Form	152
3.1. Semantic categorization of elements of logical form	152
3.2. An extensional semantics, based on satisfaction	157
3.3. From satisfaction to truth	162
4. Invisible Necessity Operators	168
4.1. Indefinites bound by overt modal operators	171
4.2. Indefinites bound by invisible modal operators	182

4.3. A note on generic and other restrictive indefinites	190
5. The Behavior of Indefinites with Respect to Constraints on Scope and Anaphora	195
5.1. The notions of binding and anaphoric relatedness	196
5.2. Constraints on scope and coindexing	199
5.3. Coindexing and scope constraints in view of the variable analysis of indefinites	210
5.4. The exceptional behavior of "specific" indefinites	220
6. Are Non-Pronominal Definites Variables Too?	226
6.1. Definite descriptions are not quantifying	226
6.2. The felicity conditions of definites with descriptive content	230
6.3. Non-referring definites and a projection problem for felicity conditions	237
6.4. Problems with narrow-scope definites	245
7. On So-called "Discourse Referents" and their Lifespans	249
8. Concluding Remarks Towards a Theory of Definiteness	263
Footnotes to Chapter II	269

CHAPTER III. DEFINITENESS IN FILE CHANGE SEMANTICS	274
1. Informative Discourse and File-Keeping	274
1.1. Introduction	274
1.2. How files relate to facts, and how utterances change them	276
1.3. File cards as discourse referents	281
1.4. Files as common grounds	285
1.5. File change potentials and satisfaction conditions	294
2. Novelty and Familiarity	298
2.1. Preliminaries	302
2.1.1. The domain of a file	302
2.1.2. How definiteness affects file change in the current theory	306
2.2. Deixis and familiarity with respect to the file	309
2.3. How to interpret constraints on coindexing	315
2.4. The Novelty-Familiarity-Condition and the Projection Problem	320
3. Truth	326
3.1. Is Existential Closure dispensable?	327
3.2. A truth criterion for utterances, based on truth values of files	329

3.3. Truth of an utterance with respect to a false file	337
4. Quantification	341
4.1. Quantified structures and file change	342
4.2. Selection indices eliminated	351
4.3. Why are the nuclear scopes of operators existentially closed?	359
4.4. Summary of the revised interpretation rules	363
5. Definite Descriptions and Related Issues	364
5.1. The Extended Novelty-Familiarity- Condition	365
5.2. Novel definites and accommodation	370
5.3. On the distribution of pronominal versus non-pronominal definites	384
6. Conclusion: Motivation for the File Change Model of Semantics	396
Footnotes to Chapter III	404
REFERENCES	409