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probability on propositions, namely made them worthy of approval. But it did so in virtue of the frequency with which it made correct predictions. This transformation from sign into evidence is the key to the emergence of a concept of probability that is dual in the sense of Chapter 2.

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| <b>10</b> | <b>Probability and the law (1665)</b>   | <b>85</b>  |
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The definition of probability as a ratio among 'equally possible cases' originates with Leibniz. The definition, unintelligible to us, was natural at the time, for possibility was either *de re* (about things) or *de dicto* (about propositions). Probability was likewise either about things, in the frequency sense, or about propositions, in the epistemic sense. Thus the duality of probability was preserved by the duality of possibility.
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- 17 The first limit theorem 154**  
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- 19 Induction (1737) 176**  
Hume's sceptical problem of induction could not have arisen much before 1660, for there was no concept of inductive evidence in terms of which to raise it. Why did it have to wait until 1737? So long as it was still believed that demonstrative knowledge was possible, a knowledge in which causes were proved from first principles, then Hume's argument could always be stopped. It was necessary that the distinction between opinion and knowledge should become a matter of degree. That means that high and low science had to collapse into one another. This had been an ongoing process throughout the seventeenth century. It was formalized by Berkeley who said that all causes were merely signs. Causes had been the prerogative of high science, and signs the tool of the low. Berkeley identified them and Hume thereby became possible.
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