Contents

List	of contributors	vii
	oduction mas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker	1
1.	Land assemblage: efficiency and equity in public-private projects Zachary Grossman, Jonathan Pincus, and Perry Shapiro	14
2.	The economics of activity levels in tort liability and regulation Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S. Ulen	33
3.	Liability versus regulation for product-related risks Thomas J. Miceli, Rebecca Rabon, and Kathleen Segerson	54
4.	Regulation versus liability: a behavioral economics perspective Kathleen Segerson and Tsvetan Tsvetanov	69
5.	Strict liability when victims choose the value of the asset at risk Florian Baumann and Tim Friehe	87
6.	Incentives for care, litigation, and tort reform under self- serving bias Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin, and Sergei Izmalkov	112
7.	Tort standards and legal expenditures: a unified model Jef De Mot and Ben Depoorter	156
8.	Litigation success functions Jef De Mot	165
9.	The optimal amount of distorted testimony when the arbiter can and cannot commit Winand Emons and Claude Fluet	175
10.	Do exclusionary rules convict the innocent? Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard McAdams	193

vi Research handbook on economic models of law

11.	Search, seizure and false (?) arrest: an analysis of fourth amendment remedies when police can plant evidence Dhammika Dharmapala and Thomas J. Miceli	208
12.	Crime, expectations, and the deterrence hypothesis Matthew J. Baker and Niklas J. Westelius	235
13.	Active courts and menu contracts Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli, and Andrew Postlewaite	281
14.	The efficiency of affirmative action with purely historical discrimination Abraham L. Wickelgren	308
15.	The multi-layered action of trademark: meaning, law and market Giovanni B. Ramello	341
Index		357