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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS

S. tot. log. refers to Ockham's *Summa totius logicae*, 1508 edition.

Exp. aur. refers to Ockham's *Expositio aurea super artem veterem*. The Roman numerals, I, II, and III, indicate respectively those portions of the "Golden Exposition" concerned with Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categoriae*, and Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. The page references are to the 1496 edition.