

# Contents

List of Contributors	ix
Preface	xi
1 Introduction	1
<u>PART I On Method</u>	
2 The Qualities of a Natural Economist JAMES M. BUCHANAN	9
3 Natural Economist or Popperian Logician? CHARLES K. ROWLEY	20
4 Gordon Tullock as Rhetorical Economist RICHARD E. WAGNER	27
<u>PART II The Original Insight</u>	
5 The Calculus of Consent CHARLES K. ROWLEY	41
6 Calculus and Consent PETER H. ARANSON	60
7 The Calculus of Consent; Notes in Retrospection WILLIAM C. MITCHELL	66
<u>PART III The Vote Motive</u>	
8 The Voting Paradox DENNIS C. MUELLER	77
9 The Robustness of the Voting Paradox CHARLES C. PLOTT	100

*Contents*

PART IV Interest Groups

- 10 **Parchment, Guns, and the Maintenance of Constitutional Contract** 105  
RICHARD E. WAGNER
- 11 **Public Choice and the Choices of the Public** 122  
ARTHUR SELDON
- 12 **Bureaucracy** 135  
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN

PART V Rent-Seeking

- 13 **Is the Theory of Rent-Seeking Here to Stay?** 143  
ROBERT D. TOLLISON
- 14 **Rent-Seeking is Here to Stay** 158  
MICHAEL A. CREW
- 15 **Rent-Seeking and the New Institutional Economics** 163  
DOUGLASS C. NORTH

PART VI The Law

- 16 **Public Choice and the Law: The Paradox of Tullock** 171  
CHARLES J. GOETZ
- 17 **Tullock and the Inefficiency of the Common Law** 181  
SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN
- 18 **The Logic of the Law Revisited** 186  
WARREN F. SCHWARTZ

PART VII The Reform of Institutions

- 19 **Why Some Welfare-State Redistribution to the Poor is a Great Idea** 191  
MANCUR OLSON
- 20 **A Political Economy of Budget Deficits** 223  
MARGARET A. MONACO and CHARLES K. ROWLEY
- Appendix 243
- Index 258