

# **The Anti-Abuse Rule for Permanent Establishments Situated in Third States**

**A Legal Analysis of Article 29(8)  
OECD Model**

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**Volume 16**

**WU Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law  
European and International Tax Law and Policy Series**

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