THE

CONTENTS.

THE Introduction concerning the Causes of Atheism. Page I

PROP. I. That Something has existed from Eternity.

Of the Difficulty of Conceiving Eternity.

Introduction of Apprehension on the one side, ought not to be opposed to evident Demonstration on the other:

as in our Conceptions of Eternity,

Infinity, of the Divisibility of Quantity, &c.

Prop. II. That there has existed from Eternity some one Immutable and Independent Being.

Of the Absolute Impossibility of an Eternal Succession of Dependent Beings, existing without any Original Independent (ause at all.

Prop. III. That that Immutable and Independent Being, which has existed from

from Eternity, without any External Cause of its Existence, must be Self-existent, that is, Necessarily-Existing.

p. 27

Of the true Idea of Self-Existence: That it is the Idea of a Being, the Supposition of whose Non-Existence is an express Contradiction. That every Manmay be more certain of the Being of a Supreme Independent Cause, than he can be of any thing else besides his own Existence. Of the Idea of God including Self-Existence. That the Material World cannot possibly be the First, Original and Independent Being. Mr. Toland's pernicious Opinion of Motion being essential to Matter, confu-·ted. 46 A Confutation of Spinoza's Opinion

concerning one only Substance. 50
Concerning the Eternity of the World:
And that the Opinion of the best Antient
Philosophers in that Matter, did not at
all favour the Sentiments of our Modern
Atheists. 57

Prop IV. What the Substance and Estence of that Being, which is Self-Existent or Necessarily-Existing, is; we have no Idea, neither is it possible for us in any measure to comprehend it.

p. 74

Of the Weakness of those, who have imagined Infinite Space to be a just Representation or Idea of the Essence of the Supreme Cause.

Of the Vanity of explaining things by such School Terms, as have really no Signification at all.

Prop. V. That though the Substance or Essence of the Self-Existent Being, is it self absolutely incomprehensible to us: Yet many of the Essential Attributes of his Nature are strictly Demonstrable, as well as his Existence. As in the First Place, that He must of Necessity be Eternal. p. 81

Of the manner of our Conceiving the E.
ternity of God, with respect to Succession.

82, 84

Prop. VI. That the Self-Existent Being, must of Necessity be Infinite and Omnipresent.

p. 86

Of the Simplicity, Unchangeableness, Incorruptibility,&c. of his Nature. 89 Of the Manner of our Conceiving the Immensity of God. 91

Prop. VII. That the Self-Existent Being must of Necessity be but One. p. 93

Of the Trinity of Persons, in Unity of Nature. 95 Of the Absolute Impossibility of two different Self-Existent Independent Principles, such as God and Matter. 96 The Error of Spinoza, concerning One Uniform Substance. 96

Prop. VIII. That, the Self-Existent and Original Cause of all Things, must be an Intelligent Being. p. 101

This, the main Question between us and the Atheists.

Not easily proved a priorious 102
But demonstrably proved a posteriori, from the Variety and Degrees of Perfection in Things, and the Order of Causes and Effects.

From the Intelligence that Created Beings are confessedly indued with. 106

That, if Intelligence be a real distinct Quality or Perfection; and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion; then Beings indued with Intelligence, can never possibly have arisen purely out of that which it self had no such Perfection.

That Intelligence is such a real distinct Perfection; and not possible to be a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion.

In Mr. Hobbs forced to recur to that prodigiously absurd Opinion, that all Matter, as Matter, is endued with Thought.

The Proposition demonstrated further, from the Beauty, Order and Final Causes of Things.

From the Original of Motion.

122
That the Material World cannot possibly have been Self-Existent.

Prop. IX. That the Self-Existent and Original Cause of all Things, is not a Necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice. p. 126

This Proposition a Necessary Consequent of the foregoing.

127

Proved.

The Contents.	
Proved further, from the Arbitrary	Dif-
polition of Things in the World;	viin
a full Answer to Spinoza's Argum	ents
for the Necessity of all Things.	130
Also from Final Causes.	140
And from the Finiteness of Cre	ated
Herno c.	142
And from the Impossibility of an	Infi-
nite Succession of Causes.	144
That Liberty is not in it self an im	pof-
fible and contradictory Notion.	148
Prop. X. That the Self-Existent Be	eing,
the Supreme Cause of all Thi	ings,
must of Necessity have Inf	inite
Power. p.	150
Of working Contradictions, and N	Tatu-
ral or Moral Evils. Of the Power of Creating Matter.	156
Of the Power of Creating Immat	erial
Cogitative Substances, and those in	dued
with Liberty of Will or Choice.	
Of the Immersion of Humana C	~Ī.

165 That the Power of Perception is not con-fined to Bodily Senses. 167 Of the Possibility of communicating to a Creature the Power of beginning Motion.

Of the Possibility of induing a Creature with Freedom of Will. 178 An answer to Spinoza's and Mr. Hobbs's Arguments against the Possibility of Liberty. 181 That there must be somewhere a Beginning of Operation. 183 That Thinking and Willing, neither are, nor can possibly be, Qualities or Affections of Matter. 188 That, Supposing they were Affections of Matter, yet even that most absurd Supposition would not at all affect the Question about the Possibility of Liberty. 200 A shameful Fallacy of Mr. Hobbs and his Followers arguing; who, when they would prove the Soul to be mere Matter, then they suppose Matter to be a Substance capable, not only of Figure and Motion, but also of other unknown Properties: And when they would prove the Will and all other Operations of the Soul to be Necessary, then they devest Matter of all its Unknown Properties, and make it Mere Solidity indued only with Figure and Motion again. 201

Of the Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding.

206
Of the Certainty of Divine Fore-knowledge, not repugnant to the Liberty of Mens Actions.

209
Of the Original of Evil.

218

Prop. XI. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all things, must of Necessity be Infinitely Wise. p. 221

Proved a Priori.

And a Posteriori, from the Wisdom and Perfection of the Works of God, evidenced more illustriously in the late Discoveries in Astronomy and Natural Philosophy.

Prop. XII. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of Necessity be a Being of infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections; such as become the Supreme Governour and Judge of the World.

p. 233

Of Providence. 241
The Necessity of God's Moral Attributes, consistent will perfect Liberty. 243
Of

Of the Necessity of God's doing always what is Best and Fittest in the whole.
247
Of the Impossibility of his doing Evil.
250
That Liberty is not in it self an Imper-
fection, but a Perfection. 252
Of the highest moral Perfection of Ra-
tional Creatures, not excluding Natu-
ral Liberty. 254
ral Liberty. 254 That the Grounds of all Moral Obli-
gations are Eternal and Necessary, and

The Conclusion.

depend not on any Laws.

259

255

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