

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	xvii
<i>Preface to the Second Edition</i>	xxiii

PART I SEMANTICS FOR INTENTIONALITY

1 Intentional Operators	5
2 Identity	31
3 Objects of Thought	56
4 Characterization and Descriptions	82

PART II IN DEFENCE OF NON-BEING

5 On What There Isn't	105
6 Fiction	116
7 Mathematical Objects and Worlds	134
8 Multiple Denotation	156

PART III IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AND (OTHER) NON-EXISTENT OBJECTS

9 Possibility, Impossibility, and Conceivability	183
10 Lost in Translation	198
11 Phenomenological Pointing	207
12 Poor Non-Existent Objects	216
13 Other Issues from the First Edition	231

PART IV *ET CETERA*

14	Creating Non-Existents	263
15	Neighbourhood Semantics	281
16	Self-Deception	297
17	<i>Sein</i> Language	308
18	How the Particular Quantifier Became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs	323
	<i>Bibliography</i>	343
	<i>Supplementary Bibliography</i>	349
	<i>Name Index</i>	357
	<i>Subject Index</i>	361

Detailed Table of Contents

<i>Preface</i>	xvii
<i>Preface to the Second Edition</i>	xxiii

PART I SEMANTICS FOR INTENTIONALITY

1 Intentional Operators	5
1.1 Introduction: Intentionality	5
1.2 Operators and Predicates	6
1.3 World Semantics	8
1.4 Noneism: A First Appearance	13
1.5 Worlds, Possible and Impossible	15
1.6 Negation	19
1.7 Open Worlds	20
1.8 Conclusion	25
1.9 Technical Appendix	25
2 Identity	31
2.1 Introduction: Identity and Intentionality	31
2.2 Adding Identity	31
2.3 Eubulides the Paradoxer	32
2.4 The Hooded Man Paradox	34
2.5 Descriptions and Rigid Designators	37
2.6 The Puzzle about Pierre	38
2.7 Frege and SI	40
2.8 SI and Open Worlds	42
2.9 Worlds and Identities	43
2.10 The <i>De Re</i> Argument	47
2.11 Conclusion	50
2.12 Technical Appendix	51
3 Objects of Thought	56
3.1 Introduction: Intentional Predicates	56
3.2 Non-Existence	56

3.3	A Formal Semantics	59
3.4	Substitutivity of Identicals	61
3.5	Indeterminacy	63
3.6	Conclusion	67
3.7	Appendix: Medieval Accounts of Intentionality	68
3.7.1	Non-Existence	68
3.7.2	Ockham on Indeterminacy	72
3.7.3	Ockham on Substitutivity	75
3.7.4	Buridan on Indeterminacy and Substitutivity	77
4	Characterization and Descriptions	82
4.1	Introduction: <i>Sein</i> and <i>Sosein</i>	82
4.2	The Characterization Principle	83
4.3	Further Comments	85
4.4	Identity	87
4.5	Indefinite Descriptions	91
4.6	Definite Descriptions and Speaker-Intention	93
4.7	Properties of Descriptions	95
4.8	Conclusion	96
4.9	Technical Appendix	97
PART II IN DEFENCE OF NON-BEING		
5	On What There Isn't	105
5.1	Introduction: Quine's Critique	105
5.2	Russell's Meinongianism	105
5.3	Russell's Critique of Meinong	106
5.4	On What There Is	108
5.5	The Possible Fat Man in the Doorway	110
5.6	Conclusion	115
6	Fiction	116
6.1	Introduction: Fictional Objects	116
6.2	Fictional Operators	116
6.3	Creating Objects	118
6.4	Some Objections	121
6.5	Conclusion	124
6.6	Appendix: <i>Sylvan's Box</i>	125
7	Mathematical Objects and Worlds	134
7.1	Introduction: Kinds of Non-Existent Object	134
7.2	Abstract Objects	135

7.3	Worlds	138
7.4	Five Objections	140
7.5	Referring	141
7.6	Knowing	144
7.7	The a Priori	147
7.8	Applying Mathematics	149
7.9	Platonism	152
7.10	Conclusion	155
8	Multiple Denotation	156
8.1	Introduction: A Paradox of Denotation	156
8.2	Semantic Paradoxes of Self-Reference	156
8.3	The Paradox of Hilbert and Bernays	157
8.4	Solutions	159
8.5	Multiple Denotation Semantics	160
8.6	Properties of the Semantics	163
8.7	The Paradox Revisited	164
8.8	Definite Descriptions	166
8.9	Conclusion	169
8.10	Technical Appendix	169

**PART III IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AND (OTHER)
NON-EXISTENT OBJECTS**

9	Possibility, Impossibility, and Conceivability	183
9.1	Introduction: New Light on Old Issues	183
9.2	Possible Worlds	183
9.3	A Plurality of Possibilities	185
9.4	Impossibility: The Primary Directive	187
9.5	Impossibility: The Secondary Directive	190
9.6	Conceivability	192
9.7	Conclusion	197
10	Lost in Translation	198
10.1	Introduction: Death by Translation	198
10.2	Mutual Intelligibility	198
10.3	Hale's Riposte	199
10.4	Woodward in <i>Propria Persona</i>	202
10.5	Meaning and Mud	204
10.6	Conclusion	206

11 Phenomenological Pointing	207
11.1 Introduction: A Tangle of Issues	207
11.2 Who is Holmes?	207
11.3 Imagining	208
11.4 "The Selection Problem"	211
11.5 Conclusion	215
12 Poor Non-Existent Objects	216
12.1 Introduction: Kroon's Objections	216
12.2 The Properties of Fictional Objects	216
12.3 Meinongianism in General	218
12.4 Literalism	220
12.5 The <i>F</i> Needn't be <i>F</i>	222
12.6 Telling a Story about an Existent Object	224
12.7 Descriptions Revisited	226
12.8 Conclusion	230
13 Other Issues from the First Edition	231
13.1 Introduction: A Residue of Objections	231
13.2 Parsons	231
13.2.1 Propositional Quantification	231
13.2.2 All Worlds or Some?	233
13.2.3 Descriptions	234
13.3 Hale	236
13.3.1 The Need for Impossible Worlds	236
13.3.2 Conditionals	236
13.3.3 The Nature of Identities	237
13.3.4 Identities and Substitutivity	238
13.4 Sainsbury	239
13.4.1 Fictional Problems	239
13.4.2 Hallucinating	240
13.4.3 Unicorns	241
13.5 Nolan	242
13.5.1 Characterizing Properties and the Actual World	242
13.5.2 Noneism and Dialethism	243
13.6 <i>Et Alia</i>	245
13.6.1 Entailing Existence	245
13.6.2 Non-Existent Objects and the Dual Copula Strategy	246
13.6.3 It is Actually the Case that	247
13.6.4 Things that Really don't Exist	249

13.6.5	Against Non-Existent Objects	250
13.6.6	<i>De Re</i> and <i>De Dicto</i>	252
13.6.7	Intensional Predicates with Indeterminate Complements	253
13.6.8	Holmes is Caesar	256
13.6.9	The Identity of Indiscernibles	257
13.7	Conclusion	258

PART IV ET CETERA

14	Creating Non-Existents	263
14.1	Introduction: Variable-Domain Semantics	263
14.2	Supervenience and the Non-Existent	263
14.3	Formal Semantics	264
14.3.1	The Basic Construction	264
14.3.2	Some Additional Aspects	266
14.4	The Anti-Realist Picture	268
14.4.1	Creation and Naming	268
14.4.2	Identity	269
14.4.3	Other Matters	271
14.5	Conclusion	272
14.6	Coda on <i>The Objects of Thought</i>	273
14.6.1	Crane's Noneism and TNB	273
14.6.2	TOT's Reductionism	275
14.6.3	Pleonastic Properties	276
14.6.4	Mental Files	278
14.6.5	Truth Supervenes on Being	280
15	Neighbourhood Semantics	281
15.1	Introduction: Starting with \square	281
15.2	Neighbourhood Semantics	281
15.3	Logical Omniscience: The Most Virulent Form	285
15.4	Do the Semantics Work?	287
15.5	Identity	289
15.6	Restricted Substitutivity	291
15.7	Conclusion	293
15.8	Technical Appendix	293

16 Self-Deception	297
16.1 Introduction: Belief and Contradiction	297
16.2 The Landscape	299
16.3 Deception and Self-Deception	300
16.4 Models of Self-Deception	301
16.5 Paradox	303
16.6 Disputes with Those in a State of Self-Deception	304
16.7 Coda on Knowledge	305
16.8 Conclusion	307
17 Sein Language	308
17.1 Introduction: Let it Be	308
17.2 The Finite Parts of the Verb	309
17.2.1 The Predicative Use	309
17.2.2 The Equational Use	310
17.2.3 The Existential Use	311
17.2.4 Quantifier Phrases	311
17.3 <i>There</i>	312
17.3.1 <i>There Is, I</i>	313
17.3.2 <i>There Is, II</i>	314
17.3.3 <i>There Exists</i>	315
17.4 Interlude on Van Inwagen	316
17.5 Non-Finite Parts of the Verb	318
17.5.1 As a Verb Complement	318
17.5.2 As a Noun Phrase	318
17.5.3 The Ambiguity of <i>Being</i>	319
17.5.4 Being and Beings	320
17.6 Some Methodological Comments	320
17.7 Conclusion	322
18 How the Particular Quantifier Became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs	323
18.1 Introduction: The Incredulous Stare	323
18.2 The Particular Quantifier before the Rise of Modern Logic	325
18.2.1 Aristotle	325
18.2.2 Medieval Logic	326
18.2.3 Thomas Reid	328
18.2.4 The Nineteenth Century	329
18.3 The Particular Quantifier and the Rise of Modern Logic	330
18.3.1 Peirce	330

18.3.2 Frege	331
18.3.3 Enter the Backwards 'E'	333
18.3.4 Russell's Lectures on Logical Atomism	335
18.3.5 Quine	339
18.4 Conclusion: The Closing of the Logicians' Mind	342
<i>Bibliography</i>	343
<i>Supplementary Bibliography</i>	349
<i>Index</i>	357