

CONTENTS

FACSIMILE TITLE PAGE	v
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE	vi
GENERAL EDITOR'S NOTE	vii
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION	1
1. Edwards' Life while Writing the <i>Inquiry</i>	2
2. The Theological Issue	8
3. The Philosophical Argument	11
Definition of Liberty	12
The Act of Volition	16
Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness	20
Is the Will Independent and Self-Moved?	23
The Origin of Arminian Notions of Liberty and Necessity, and the Shape of Edwards' Reply	27
Moral and Natural Necessity	34
4. Edwards and John Locke	47
5. Edwards and His Antagonists	65
Thomas Chubb	66
Daniel Whitby	81
Isaac Watts	89
6. Note on the Text	118
Acknowledgments	128
AUTHOR'S PREFACE	129

TEXT OF *FREEDOM OF THE WILL*

<i>Part I.</i> Wherein Are Explained Various Terms and Things Belonging to the Subject of the Ensuing Discourse	135
SECTION 1. Concerning the Nature of the Will	137
SECTION 2. Concerning the Determination of the Will	141
SECTION 3. Concerning the Meaning of the Terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, etc. and of Contingence	149
SECTION 4. Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Necessity and Inability	156
SECTION 5. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency	163
<i>Part II.</i> Wherein It Is Considered, whether There Is, or Can Be Any Such Sort of Freedom of Will, as That wherein Arminians	

Place the Essence of the Liberty of All Moral Agents; and Whether Any Such Thing Ever Was, or Can Be Conceived of	169
SECTION 1. Shewing the Manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, Consisting in the Will's Self-determining Power	171
SECTION 2. Several Supposed Ways of Evading the Foregoing Reasoning Considered	175
SECTION 3. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, and Volition in Particular, Can Come to Pass without a Cause of Its Existence	180
SECTION 4. Whether Volition Can Arise without a Cause, through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul	186
SECTION 5. Shewing That if the Things Asserted in These Evasions Should Be Supposed to Be True, They Are Altogether Impertinent, and Can't Help the Cause of Arminian Liberty; and How This Being the State of the Case, Arminian Writers Are Obligated to Talk Inconsistently	190
SECTION 6. Concerning the Will's Determining in Things Which Are Perfectly Indifferent, in the View of the Mind	195
SECTION 7. Concerning the Notion of Liberty of Will Consisting in Indifference	203
SECTION 8. Concerning the Supposed Liberty of the Will, as Opposite to All Necessity	213
SECTION 9. Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding	217
SECTION 10. Volition Necessarily Connected with the Influence of Motives. With Particular Observation of the Great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Assertions and Reasonings, about the Freedom of the Will	225
SECTION 11. The Evidence of God's Certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of Moral Agents	239
SECTION 12. God's Certain Foreknowledge of the Future Volitions of Moral Agents, Inconsistent with Such a Contingence of Those Volitions, as Is without All Necessity. And Infers a Necessity of Volition, as Much as an Absolute Decree	257
SECTION 13. Whether We Suppose the Volitions of Moral Agents to Be Connected with Anything Antecedent, or Not, yet They Must Be Necessary, in Such a Sense, as to Overthrow Arminian Liberty	270
<i>Part III.</i> Wherein Is Inquired, whether Any Such Liberty of Will as Arminians Hold, Be Necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and Dispraise, etc.	275
SECTION 1. God's Moral Excellency Necessary, yet Virtuous and Praiseworthy	277

SECTION 2. The Acts of the Will of the Human Soul of Jesus Christ Necessarily Holy, yet Virtuous, Praiseworthy, Rewardable, etc.	281
SECTION 3. The Case of Such as Are Given Up of God to Sin, and of Fallen Man in General, Proves Moral Necessity and Inability to Be Consistent with Blameworthiness	295
SECTION 4. Command, and Obligation to Obedience, Consistent with Moral Inability to Obey	302
SECTION 5. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, Which Is Supposed to Excuse in the Nonperformance of Things in Themselves Good, Particularly Considered	312
SECTION 6. Liberty of Indifference, Not Only Not Necessary to Virtue, but Utterly Inconsistent with It: and All, either Virtuous, or Vicious Habits and Inclinations, Inconsistent with Arminian Notions of Liberty, and Moral Agency	320
SECTION 7. Arminian Notions of Moral Agency Inconsistent with All Influence of Motive and Inducement, in either Virtuous or Vicious Actions	328
<i>Part IV.</i> Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Arminians, in Support and defense of Their Notions of Liberty, Moral Agency, etc. and against the Opposite Doctrine, Are Considered	335
SECTION 1. The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of the Dispositions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, Lies Not in Their Cause, but Their Nature	337
SECTION 2. The Falseness and Inconsistence of That Metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency, Which Seems to Be Generally Entertained by the Defenders of the Forementioned Notions of Liberty, Moral Agency, etc.	343
SECTION 3. The Reasons Why Some Think It Contrary to Common Sense, to Suppose Things Which Are Necessary, to Be Worthy of either Praise or Blame	350
SECTION 4. It Is Agreeable to Common Sense, and the Natural Notions of Mankind, to Suppose Moral Necessity to Be Consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment	357
SECTION 5. Concerning Those Objections, that This Scheme of Necessity Renders All Means and Endeavors for the Avoiding of Sin, or the Obtaining Virtue and Holiness, Vain and to No Purpose; and That It Makes Men No More than Mere Machines, in Affairs of Morality and Religion	365
SECTION 6. Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, that It Agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinion of Mr. Hobbes	372
SECTION 7. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will	375

SECTION 8. Some Further Objections against the Moral Necessity of God's Volitions, Considered	384
SECTION 9. Concerning That Objection against the Doctrine Which Has Been Maintained, that It Makes God the Author of Sin	397
SECTION 10. Concerning Sin's First Entrance into the World	413
SECTION 11. Of a Supposed Inconsistence of These Principles with God's Moral Character	415
SECTION 12. Of a Supposed Tendency of These Principles to Atheism, and Licentiousness	420
SECTION 13. Concerning That Objection against the Reasoning by Which the Calvinistic Doctrine Is Supported, That It Is Metaphysical and Abstruse	423
<i>Conclusion.</i> What Treatment This Discourse May Probably Meet with, from Some Persons	430
Consequences Concerning Several Calvinistic Doctrines; such as an Universal, Decisive Providence	431
The Total Depravity and Corruption of Man's Nature, Efficacious Grace	432
An Universal and Absolute Decree; and Absolute, Eternal, Personal Election	434
Particular Redemption	435
Perseverance of Saints	435
Concerning the Treatment Which Calvinistic Writers and Divines Have Met with	437
The Unhappiness of the Change Lately in Many Protestant Countries	438
The Boldness of Some Writers	438
The Excellent Wisdom Appearing in the Holy Scriptures	439
RELATED CORRESPONDENCE	441
Introduction	443
Remarks on the <i>Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion</i>	453
To John Erskine, August 3, 1757	465
GENERAL INDEX	471
INDEX OF BIBLICAL PASSAGES	491