
Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	<i>page</i>	xi
<i>List of tables</i>		xi
<i>Preface</i>		xiii
1	Introduction	1
PART I: SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY AND UTILITARIANISM		
2	Arrow's ordinal utilitarian social welfare functions	13
	2.1 Social welfare functions	13
	2.2 Arrow's conditions	20
	2.3 The General Possibility Theorem	21
	2.4 Richer utility information	25
3	The Benthamite utilitarian social welfare functional	26
	3.1 Social welfare functionals	26
	3.2 Extended sympathy interpretation of interpersonal comparisons	33
	3.3 Axiomatizations of utilitarianism	37
	3.4 Is the Benthamite response to Arrow's paradox acceptable?	41
4	Some criticisms of Benthamite utilitarianism	43
	4.1 Critique of unrestricted domain	43
	4.2 Critique of strong neutrality (or welfarism)	45
	4.3 Critique of Paretianism	50
	4.4 The Paretian liberal paradox	51
	4.5 Critique of strong anonymity	56
	4.6 Critique of cardinal comparability	57
	4.7 Beyond Benthamite utilitarianism	67
5	The liberal utilitarian generalized social welfare functional	69
	5.1 Generalized social welfare functionals	70
		vii

	1. Quantity aggregation	76
	2. Quality aggregation	81
	3. Integrating quantity and quality aggregation	82
	5.2 Liberal utilitarianism	83
	5.3 Different levels of utilitarianism	92
	5.4 Analysis and interpretation	98
6	An ideal utilitarian social welfare functional	102
	6.1 The ideal level of liberal utilitarianism	102
	6.2 Public and private spheres	105
	6.3 The ideal utilitarian axioms	112
	6.4 Axiomatization of ideal utilitarianism	118
	6.5 On the nature of liberal democracy	120
 PART 2: MILLS UTILITARIANISM		
7	Foundations of Mill's approach	133
	7.1 Mill's epistemology	133
	7.2 The science of human nature	143
	7.3 A scientific interpretation of interpersonal comparisons	152
	7.4 The practical need for an ultimate standard of value	154
	7.5 Mill's proof of utility	159
	7.6 What really is utility?	162
8	Distinct kinds of utility	164
	8.1 Mill's theory of natural kinds	164
	8.2 A classification of utilities	166
	1. Self-regarding kinds	169
	2. Other-regarding kinds	173
	8.3 The three departments of the Art of Life	182
	8.4 The possibility of an ideal liberal democratic harmony	185
9	Utility in the largest sense	191
	9.1 Utility-maximization as the first principle of the Art of Life	191
	9.2 The principle of expediency	195
	9.3 The principles of morality	196
	1. The principle of charity or beneficence	200
	2. The principles of justice	203
	3. The principle of liberty	207
	4. Property rights	216
	9.4 Permanence and progression	221

Contents	ix
9.5 The principle of aesthetics	226
9.6 Personal happiness and the general happiness: an ideal harmony	231

PART 3: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY

10	Responses to Gibbard's rights-exercising paradox	237
	10.1 Two common illiberal responses	240
	1. 'Coherent' rights-assignments	240
	2. Rights-assignments conditional on 'separable' private utilities	241
	10.2 A liberal utilitarian response	243
	1. Social indifference the usual response	245
	2. Public intervention the response in less usual cases	247
	3. The ideal domain of separable private utilities	251
	10.3 Voluntary private domain-restriction versus public denial of libertarian rights	255
11	Responses to Sen's Paretian liberal paradox	259
	11.1 In defence of Sen's formulation of liberty	260
	11.2 The usual liberal utilitarian response to Sen's paradox: protection of libertarian rights	268
	1. Common Sen-type cases	268
	2. Distinct Gibbard-type cases	273
	11.3 Public intervention the response in less usual cases	279
	11.4 On the character of an ideal liberal citizen	289
12	On the design of democratic political institutions	294
	12.1 A 'broad' theory of democratic values	297
	12.2 Towards a corresponding 'narrow' theory of democratic institutions	300
	12.3 Ideal democratic institutions	306
	1. Direct democracy: majority voting	308
	2. Representative democracy: Hare's system of proportional representation combined with majority voting in the elected assembly	314
	12.4 Liberal constitutional constraints on democratic institutions in non-ideal contexts	324
13	Epilogue	329

Contents

<i>Notes</i>	338
<i>Bibliography</i>	368
<i>Index</i>	387

Figures

8.1	The three departments in the Art of Life	183
12.1	Liberal utilitarianism and democratic values	297
12.2	Liberal utilitarianism and democratic institutions	303
12.3	Liberal utilitarian government in the ideal case: pure democracy	324
12.4	Liberal utilitarian government outside the ideal case: constitutionally limited democracy	326

Tables

8.1	Mill's classification of utilities	181
8.2	Justice and charity: two sub-departments of morality	181
9.1	The principles of practical reason for civil societies	194