

# CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
ABBREVIATIONS OF FREGE'S WORKS	xi
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1 Searching for the foundations of arithmetic</b>	<b>9</b>
Kant's philosophy of arithmetic	9
Frege's argument from similarity	15
Frege on analyticity and a priority	23
More on truth-grounds	29
What is logic?	33
What is a <i>law</i> of logic?	37
<b>2 The Begriffsschrift and its philosophical background</b>	<b>47</b>
What is a Begriffsschrift good for?	48
The Begriffsschrift as a 'lingua characteri[st]ica'	54
The Begriffsschrift as a picture-language of thought	60
How the Begriffsschrift brings judgement to the fore	63
Concept-formation and the context-principle	68

<b>3</b>	<b>From subject and predicate to argument and function</b>	<b>74</b>
	Introduction	74
	What comes first: judgement, inference and conceptual content	76
	Variable and constant parts of <i>Begriffsschrift</i> sentences	84
	Why a <i>Begriffsschrift</i> sentence divides into argument- and function-expressions	88
	Why conceptual contents are decomposed into arguments and functions	93
	Multiple decomposability of contents	98
	Concepts and unsaturatedness	99
<b>4</b>	<b>Splitting conceptual content into sense and reference</b>	<b>103</b>
	Background: content-identity in the <i>Begriffsschrift</i>	104
	A clarification: Frege on complex and simple proper names	110
	Frege's argument for splitting conceptual content into sense and reference	112
	The main critical point and the constructive suggestion	119
	The result of the split	127
	The general notion of reference	128
	Sense without reference	131
	Sameness of sense is transparent and makes sameness of reference transparent	136
	Sense-identity	140
<b>5</b>	<b>The sense and reference of natural language singular terms</b>	<b>149</b>
	The regular and the relaxed connection between sign, sense and reference	149
	Apparent shifts of sense and reference	154
	Unsystematic shifts of sense: footnote 2 of 'On Sense and Reference'	170
	Systematic shifts of sense and reference: sentences as names of thoughts etc.	182

<b>6</b>	<b>The sense and reference of an assertoric sentence</b>	<b>192</b>
	Introduction	192
	Disaster prevention	194
	Sentences and truth-value names	196
	A sentence does not refer to a thought	201
	Truth-values in 'Function and Concept'	204
	Why sentences refer to truth-values	205
	Judgement and truth-value in 'On Sense and Reference'	209
	Judging as acknowledging the truth	214
	How are thoughts and the True (False) related?	221
	Back to sentence reference	225
<b>7</b>	<b>The sense and reference of a concept-word</b>	<b>227</b>
	What is a concept-word?	227
	Unsaturatedness in Frege's mature phase	229
	Do concept-words <i>refer</i> ?	232
	Why concept-words refer to <i>concepts</i>	238
	Why concept-words may be taken to refer to extensions	240
	Why concept-words cannot refer to extensions in particular and objects in general	245
	Concept-words, criteria of application and constitutive marks	248
	The concept-paradox or why proper names cannot refer to concepts	254
	How one can explain what a concept-word refers to?	261
	Frege's manoeuvres	262
	Biting the bullet	265
	Notes	267
	Bibliography	277
	Index	286