CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	
§ 1. Descartes' <i>Meditations</i> as the prototype of philosophi- cal reflection	1.
§ 2. The necessity of a radical new beginning of philosophy	4
FIRST MEDITATION. THE WAY TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO	
§ 3. The Cartesian overthrow and the guiding final idea	~
of an absolute grounding of science	7
immersed in science qua noematic phenomenon	9
§ 5. Evidence and the idea of genuine science	11
§ 6. Differentiations of evidence. The philosophical de-	
mand for an evidence that is apodictic and first in	
itself \ldots	14
§ 7. The evidence for the factual existence of the world	17
not apodictic; its inclusion in the Cartesian overthrow § 8. The ego cogito as transcendental subjectivity	18
 § 9. The range covered by apodictic evidence of the "Iam" 	22
§ 10. Digression: Descartes' failure to make the transcen-	
dental turn	23
§11. The psychological and the transcendental Ego. The	
transcendency of the world	25
SECOND MEDITATION. THE FIELD OF TRANSCENDENTAL EX-	
PERIENCE LAID OPEN IN RESPECT OF ITS UNIVERSAL	24
STRUCTURES	
§ 12. The idea of a transcendental grounding of knowledge	27
§ 13. Necessity of at first excluding problems relating to	29
the range covered by transcendental knowledge § 14. The stream of <i>cogitationes</i> . Cogito and cogitatum	31
§ 15. Natural and transcendental reflection	33
§16. Digression: Necessary beginning of both transcen-	
dental "purely psychological" reflection with the	<u> </u>
ego cogito	37

CONTENTS

§ 17.	The two-sidedness of inquiry into consciousness as	
Ū	an investigation of correlatives. Lines of description.	
	Synthesis as the primal form belonging to conscious-	
	ness	39
\$ 18	Identification as the fundamental form of synthesis.	
3 10.	The all-embracing synthesis of transcendental time	41
\$ 10	Actuality and potentiality of intentional life	44
•	The peculiar nature of intentional analysis	46
•	-	-10 50
•	The intentional object as "transcendental clue".	50
§ 22.	The idea of the universal unity comprising all	50
	objects, and the task of clarifying it constitutionally	53
THIR	D MEDITATION. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. TRUTH	
AN	D ACTUALITY	
§ 23.	A more pregnant concept of constitution, under the	
·	titles "reason" and "unreason".	56
§ 24.	Evidence as itself-givenness and the modifications of	
0	evidence	57
§ 25.	Actuality and quasi-actuality	58
-	Actuality as the correlate of evident varification	59
•	Habitual and potential evidence as functioning consti-	•
3 21.	tutively for the sense "existing object"	60
\$ 28	Presumptive evidence of world-experience. World	00
ş 20.		
	as an idea correlative to a perfect experiential evi-	61
6.00	dence	61
§ 29.	Material and formal ontological regions as indexes	10
	pointing to transcendental systems of evidence	62
FOUR	TH MEDITATION. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION-	
AL	PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO	
HII	MSELF	
§ 30.	The transcendental ego inseparable from the processes	
	making up his life	65
§ 31.	The Ego as identical pole of the subjective processes	66
	The Ego as substrate of habitualities	66
-	The full concretion of the Ego as monad and the	
0	problem of his self-constitution	67
§ 34	A fundamental development of phenomenological	
J 0 1.	method. Transcendental analysis as eidetic	69
	mentou, iranscendentai anarysis as cluctic	09

х

CONTENTS

	Excursus into eidetic internal psychology The transcendental ego as the universe of possible forms of subjective process. The compossibility of subjective processes in coexistence or succession as	72
	subject to eidetic laws	73
§ 37.	Time as the universal form of all egological genesis	75
	Active and passive genesis	77
-	Association as a principle of passive genesis	80
	Transition to the question of transcendental idealism	81
- EX	Genuine phenomenological explication of one's own	01
3	"ego cogito" as transcendantal idealism	83
		00
FIFTH	I MEDITATION. UNCOVERING OF THE SPHERE OF	
TR	ANSCENDENTAL BEING AS MONADOLOGICAL INTER-	
	BJECTIVITY	
	Exposition of the problem of experiencing someone	
5	else, in rejoinder to the objection that phenomenology	
	entails solipsism	89
8 43	The noematic-ontic mode of givenness of the Other,	0,
3 .0.	as transcendental clue for the constitutional theory	
	of the experience of someone else	90
8 44	Reduction of transcendental experience to the sphere	10
y 11.		92
\$ 15	The transcendental ego, and self-apperception as a	14
y 40.	psychophysical man reduced to what is included in	
		99
\$ 44	my ownness	79
g 40.	Ownness as the sphere of the actualities and potenti-	100
C 47	alities of the stream of subjective processes	100
§ 47.	The intentional object also belongs to the full	
	monadic concretion of ownness. Immanent transcen-	100
	dence and primordial world	103
§ 48.	The transcendency of the Objective world as be-	
	longing to a level higher than that of primordial	
	transcendency	105
§ 49.	Predelineation of the course to be followed by in-	
	tentional explication of experiencing what is other	106
§ 50.	The mediate intentionality of experiencing someone	
	else, as "appresentation" (analogical apperception) .	108

XI

CON	TEN	TS

ļ

§51.	"Pairing" as an associatively constitutive component	
	of my experience of someone else	112
§ 52.	Appresentation as a kind of experience with its own	
	style of verification	113
§ 53.	Potentialities of the primordial sphere and their	
	constitutive function in the apperception of the	
	Other	116
§ 54.	Explicating the sense of the appresentation wherein	
	I experience someone else	117
§ 55.	Establishment of the community of monads. The	
	first form of Objectivity: intersubjective Nature	120
§ 56.	Constitution of higher levels of intermonadic com-	
	munity	128
§ 57.	Clarification of the parallel between explication of	
	what is internal to the psyche and egological transcen-	
	dental explication	131
§ 58.	Differentiation of problems in the intentional analysis	
	of higher intersubjective communities. I and my sur-	
	rounding world	131
§ 59.	Ontological explication and its place within consti-	104
° ()	tutional transcendental phenomenology as a whole .	136
§ 60.	Metaphysical results of our explication of experi-	120
6 (1	encing someone else	139
g 61.	The traditional problems of "psychological origins"	1 4 1
\$ ()	and their phenomenological clarification	141
§ 0∠.	Survey of our intentional explication of experiencing	140
	someone else	148
CONC	LUSION	
	The task of criticizing transcendental experience and	
<i>3</i> 00.	knowledge	151
8 6 4	Concluding word	
304.		102

XII