## **CONTENTS**

ΓR	ANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION	ix
	INTRODUCTION	
	The development of modern psychology, Dilthey's decisive critique and his proposals for a reform (explanatory and descriptive psychology). The reasons for the limited influence of Dilthey upon his contemporaries: the inadequacy of their understanding and the limits of his	1
	beginning.	7
3.	Task and significance of the Logical Investigations.	14
	<ul> <li>a) Critique of psychologism; the essence of irreal (ideal) objects and of irreal (ideal) truths.</li> <li>b) Researching the correlation: ideal object - psychic lived exper-</li> </ul>	14
	iencing (forming of sense) by means of essential description	
	in the reflective attitude.	17
	c) More precise characterization of the reflection decisive for phenomenology (step by step accomplishment of the reflection).	20
	d) Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience – discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the psychic.	22
	e) The further development of the thought of intentionality in the Logical Investigations. The productive character of consciousness. Transition from a purely descriptive psychology to an a priori (eidetic-intuitive) psychology and its significance for	
	the theory of knowledge.	25
	f) The consistent expansion and deepening of the question raised by the <i>Logical Investigations</i> . Showing the necessity of an epistemological grounding of a priori sciences by transcendental	
	phenomenology – the science of transcendental subjectivity.	30
4.	Summarizing characterization of the new psychology.	33
	SYSTEMATIC PART	
5.	Delimiting phenomenological psychology: distinguishing it from the other socio-cultural sciences and from the natural sciences. Ouestioning the concepts, nature and mind.	38

	Necessity of the return to the pre-scientific experiential world and to the experience in which it is given (harmony of experience).	40
7.	Classifying the sciences by a return to the experiental world. The systematic connection of the sciences, based upon the structural	
	connection of the experiential world; idea of an all-inclusive science as science of the all-inclusive world-structure and of the	
	concrete sciences which have as their theme the individual forms	47
Q	of experiential objects. Significance of the empty horizons.  The science of the all-inclusive world-structure as a priori science.	47 51
	Seeing essences as genuine method for grasping the a priori.	53
•	a) Variation as the decisive step in the dissociation from the fac-	
	tual by fantasy – the eidos as the invariable.	54
	b) Variation and alteration.	55
	c) The moments of ideation: starting with an example (model); disclosure brought about by an open infinity of variants (optional-	
	ness of the process of forming variants); overlapping coinci-	
	dence of the formation of variants in a synthetic unity; grasping	
	what agrees as the eidos.	57
	d) Distinguishing between empirical generalization and ideation.	58
	e) Bringing out the sequence of levels of genera and gaining the	
	highest genera by variation of ideas – seeing of ideas without starting from experience.	60
	f) Summarizing characterization of the seeing of essences.	63
10.	The method of intuitive universalization and of ideation as instru-	05
	ments toward gaining the universal structural concepts of a world	
	taken without restriction by starting from the experiential world	
	("natural concept of the world"). Possibility of an articulation of	
	the sciences of the world and establishment of the signification of the science of the mind.	65
11.	Characterizing the science of the natural concept of the world.	03
	Differentiating this concept of experience from the Kantian con-	
	cept of experience. Space and time as the most universal struc-	
	tures of the world.	70
12.	Necessity of beginning with the experience of something singular, in which passive synthesis brings about unity.	73
13.	Distinguishing between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient	13
10.	realities. Determination of real unity by means of causality.	75
	Order of realities in the world.	78
15.	Characterizing the psychophysical realities of the experiential	
16	world. Greater self-sufficiency of the corporeal vis-a-vis the psyche.	79
10.	The forms in which the mental makes its appearance in the experiential world. The specific character of the cultural object,	
	which is determined in its being by a relation to a subject.	83
17.	Reduction to pure realities as substrates of exclusively real proper-	05
	ties. Exclusion of irreal cultural senses.	90
18.	Opposition of the subjective and the objective in the attitude of	
10	the natural scientist.	91
20.	The true world in itself a necessary presumption.  Objectivity demonstrable in intersubjective agreement. Normalcy	95
	and abnormalcy.	07

CONTENTS vii

21.	Hierarchical structure of the psychic.	99
22.	Concept of physical reality as enduring substance of causal deter-	
	minations.	101
23.	Physical causality as inductive. Uniqueness of psychic interweaving.	103
	The unity of the psychic.	107
25.	The idea of an all-inclusive science of nature. Dangers of the	
	naturalistic prejudice.	109
26.	The subjective in the world as objective theme.	110
	The difficulty that the objective world is constituted by excluding	
	the subjective, but that everything subjective itself belongs to the	
	world.	113
28.	Carrying out the reflective turn of regard toward the subjective.	
	The perception of physical things in the reflective attitude.	115
29.	Perceptual field - perceptual space.	123
	Spatial primal presence.	125
	Hyle - hyletic data as matter for intentional functions.	127
	Noticing givenness as I-related mode of givenness of the object.	128
	Objective temporality and temporality of the stream.	130
	Distinction between immanent and transcendent, real and irreal in	
	perception. The object as irreal pole.	131
35.	Substrate-pole and property-pole. The positive significance of the	
:	empty horizon.	138
36.	The intentional object of perception.	140
37.	The phenomenological reduction as a method of disclosing the	
	immanent.	143
38.	The access to pure subjectivity from external perception.	147
39.	Analysis of perception with regard to the perceiver himself.	150
40.	The problem of temporality: presenting - retention and protention	
	(positional and quasi-positional modifications of perception and their	
	significance for practical life).	153
41.	Reflection upon the object-pole in the noematic attitude and reflection	
	upon the I-pole as underlying it. All-inclusive synthesis of the I-pole.	
	The I as pole of activities and habitualities.	157
42.	The I of primal institutions and of institutions which follow others.	
	Identity of the I maintaining its convictions. The individuality of the	
	I makes itself known in its decisions which are based upon convictions.	162
43.	The unity of the subject as monad - static and genetic investigation	
	of the monad. Transition from the isolated monad to the totality of	
	monads.	165
44.	Phenomenological psychology foundational both for the natural	
	and for the personal exploration of the psyche and for the correspond-	
	ing sciences.	166
45.	Retrospective sense-investigation.	170
	SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	180
	INDEX	181