# ТНЕ

# CONTENTS.

THE Preface. An Abstract of the main things which are controver fial in the four Books, with the Ground or Reason of charging the Ideal Principles with Scepticism in general, and particularly as they relate to Natural and Reveal'd Religion.

### Book I. CHAP. I.

THE Introduction. The Defign. What Ideas are in the Authors fense. What an Idea is properly. Substance and Mode, less ambiguous words and comprehend all that can be intended by the word Idea.

### CHAP. II.

No Innate Principles in the Mind.

THE true state of the Question about inmate Ideas.

In the Authors sense of the word Innate, there can be none Innate, but in the common and proper sense of that word, there are Innate Ideas or Modes of Sensation, and Principles both Speculative and Practical.

What is meant by Innate Principles.

All the Authors Objections obviated by the true State of the Question; or Answerable.

### CHAP. III.

No Innate Practical Principles.

W Hat InnatePracticalPrinciples are. The Question about innate practical Principles truly stated. The Reasons why we believe there are such. The Objections answered.

### CHAP. IV.

Other confiderations concerning Innate Principles both Speculative and Practical.

THE Authors Arguments against Innate Principles farther urg'd and answered.

What is meant by the Notion of GOD.

How we come naturally by the Notion of GOD.

Arguments to prove the Notion of GOD is not artificial.

All the Arguments against an innate Notion of GOD answered distinctly.

Book II. CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in General and their Original.

THE common account of the Original of all Knowledge.

Sentation, what.

Imagination, what.

Understanding, what in the strict fenfe.

Judging, what.

Reasoning, what.

Memory, what.

This Authors way of coming to all our Knowledge explained.

Sensation not the Original of all Knowledge.

The Authors arguments to prove all Knowledge derived from the Senses not sufficient.

His Affertion, that the Soul does not always Think, explained and examined.

His Arguments to prove that Affertion, not conclusive.

C H A P. II. Of Simple Ideas. W Hat this Author means by Simple Ideas. How that he means is commonly expressed by others.

CHAP. III. Of the Ideas of one Senfe. What he and others mean by Ideas of one Senfe.

# C H A P. IV. Of Solidity.

His Authors new Senfe of that word. The common Senfe of that word. Extension not the Effential property of Bodies.

Space Extended.

The Authors Arguments to prove Extension the Essence of Bodies examined.

Body distinct from Space.

The Authors experiment to prove a Vacuum by the pressure of a Globe of Gold filled with Water, forc'd thence by Screws, not conclusive.

- No Experiments prove a Vacuum or difprove it fully.
- The best Argument is, that Body and Space may be distinctly conceiv'd.

C H A P. V. Of Simple Ideas of diverse Senses.

# C H A P. VI. Of Simple Ideas of Reflexion.

### CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of both Senfation and Reflexion, particularly of Pain and Pleafure; but none of these are Ideas, only Modes of Senfation.

### CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Confiderations concerning Simple Ideas.

Hat this Author means by Simple Ideas, only different Modes of Perception.

No Perceptions from a privative Caufe.

Qualities in Bodies primary or secondary; but cannot be so distinguish'd, if Ideas.

All Bodies operate upon others by immediate Contact.

From whence arife all fenfible Qualities.

Arguments to prove that they arife from the variety of Motion, Figure, Bulk, Position in the Objects.

### CHAP. IX.

### Of Perception.

Perception strictly is the same with Sensation.

Perception no Idea.

Perception not Motion.

The Senfes often corrected by the Judgement; and the Authors arguments explained and examined.

That Brutes perceive, probable but not certain. The Infirmities of old Age no good Argument

that thereby they become Brutes. Perception the first Step to Knowlege.

СНАР. Х.

## Of Retention.

Hat Retention is. Ideas faid to be in the Memory are no where.

What does improve and prejudice Memory. Memory an active Power of the Mind.

The necessity of Memory.

Mr. Paichal's Memory incredible.

The finging of Birds no full proof of their Perception.

CHAP.

### CHAP. XI.

- Of Differing and other Operations of the Mind.
- Difcerning and Judgment much the fame.
- The Excellency of Judgment chiefly in Difagreement, and why.
- This Author's Confusion in the Sense of the Word Idea discover'd in a plain Instance he gives bimself.
- The Power of Comparing, the Same with Judging.
- No General Ideas.
- The Powers of compounding and enlarging exercis'd only about complex Notions.
- Names not always the Signs of Ideas.
- The abstracting Faculty only the Power of comparing Particulars, and giving general Names.
- The word Idea not expressive of the adequate Objects of our Thoughts.
- The Difference between Ideots and Madmen.
- Ideas not the Foundation of Certainty or true Knowledge.
- No Knowledge gain'd by Contemplation of Simple Ideas.

### CHAP. XII.

### Of Complex Ideas.

- THis Author's Confusion concerning complex Ideas.
- The word Mode ill used and defin'd by this Author.
- Substances obscurely defined by this Author, and what he calls so are not Substances, only the common Names of Substances.

Relations not Ideas, but Modes of Conception with their Names.

### CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and first of the Simple Modes of Space.

S Imple Modes very confufedly deficrib'd by this Author. His Notion of Space explain'd. The fame farther explain'd. How we form the Notion of Immensity. Figure, what. Place what; and distinctly explain'd. The Dispute about a Vacuum endles. The Cartesian Dilemma avoidable only by owning Space to be a Substance. Two Arguments to prove a Vacuum, used by this Author, not conclusive. Motion does not prove a Vacuum without begging the Question. The best Argument to prove a Vacuum.

The Reafons why Men agree in fingle Apprehensions, not in Complex.

### CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration and its fimple Modes.

# THE Notions of Duration, and Time, and their Measures.

- Time or Duration not menfurable exactly meerly by Succession of Thoughts, and why.
- The Author's Argument to prove Succeffion of Ideas, not Motion, the Meafure of Time, explain'd and examin'd ? Theughts are not Motion

Thoughts are not Motion.

- Periodical Motions the common Meafures of Time.
- The Motions of the Sun, tho' not exactly (A) regular,

regular, a better Measure of Time than Succession of Ideas.

- Duration is mensurable without the actual Existence of the things themselves, by whose Motions it is measured.
- Hence it may be concluded, all Knowledge is not derived from Senfation in Three Instances.

### CHAP. XV.

- Of Duration and Expansion confidered together.
- N what they agree : Enumerated and Explained.
- In what they difagree Enumerated and Explained.
- Extension of Spirits is as conceivable as of Motion.

### CHAP. XVI.

Of Number.

Number what ? Not an Idea. Why Demonstration in Number more exact than in Figure. Why diftinct Names or Figures necessary in Numbering. Distinct Names for great round Numbers very useful. Number measures all things, explain'd.

### CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity.

Hat the Words Finite and Infinite fignify Originally; though that is no very material Enquiry.

- Infinity may be as properly attributed to God's Wisdom and Power, as to bis Duration and Ubiquity.
- The way we gain the Notion of Infinity. The Power of forming that Notion not derived from the Senfes.
- Why we don't attribute Infinity to fingle Qualities, as we do to Space, Duration and Number.
- Infinity of Space and Space Infinite, a very nice diffunction and needless; because Infinity is no Idea, but a Rational Deduction.
- Though we can have no Positive Idea of Infinity, yet we may have a positive reason to believe a thing is infinite.
- No negative Ideas.

### CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

S Imple Modes only fingle Qualities varied, but not Simple Ideas; particularly explained.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

Modes of Thinking are not Simple Ideas. What Senfation is. What Remembrance. Recollection what, and how diftinguish'd from Remembrance. Contemplation, what. Refvery, a French Word, Explained. Attention, what. Intention, what. Dreaming, what. None of these Modes of Thinking gain'd by Reflexion.

Think-

Thinking may be the Essence of the Soul, though it be an Attion. Whether Self-activity, as including both Thinking and Notion, be not the Essential Property of a Spirit, deserves to be confider'd.

### CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleafure and Pain.

PLeasure and Pain not Ideas, only Modes of Schlation so named. Good and Evil defin'd by this Author, but liable to Exception, and why; Explain'd.

CHAP. XXI. Misprinted XIX.

### Of Power.

- THE Signification of the word Power explain'd.
- Liberty and Necessity what, Explain'd.
- The way we come to know the Powers of Substances.
- Powers nothing really but the Properties in Substances, whether Active or Passive.
- Active Power properly only in Spirits.
- The Will, what.
- The Understanding, what.
- This Author's Definition of Liberty exceptionable.
- Liberty not a Power, but only the Abfence, Defest or Suspension of a Power in any Agent, distinct from that Agent which has Power.
- Liberty of the Will not derogatory to the Omnipotency of God.
- The occasion of the mistake, that the Will is not free.
- The plain state of the Question about the Liberty of the Will.

- The Liberty of the Will vindicated from this Author's. Objections distinctly.
- Man is own'd a free Agent by this Author.
- This Author's Principles quite different from Mr. Hobbs's.
- Liberty of the Will no Diminution to any of the Divine Perfections.
- Liberty. not rightly stated by this Author.
- A Question not fairly worded by this Author.
- What determines the Will.
- Defire differs from the Will, but not from the Act of the Will, or Volition.
- Defire not rightly defin'd by this Author.
- Cautions against making Uneafiness the sole motive of the Will.
- To be determin'd by Reafon no diminution to Liberty, and why.
- Reasons of wrong Judgment enquir'd into, and this Author's meaning in that enquiry Explain'd.
- The Causes of Men's Mis-judgment concerning Natural Evil, Explain'd.
- The Caufes of Men's Mis-judgment of Moral Evil, Explain'd.
- The Author's Review of Original Ideas explain'd.

### CHAP. XII.

Of Mix'd Modes.

The Difference between this Author's Notions and others about mix'd Actions.

- Number as capable of various Modification as Motion or Thinking.
- Modification of Power improper.

Words don't signifie the Modes of Operation in any Case.

### C H A P. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

- CUbstances, what.
- The Philosophick Sense of the words Effence and Nature.
- Substance as well conceived as Mode, either in general or particular.
- The Existence of Substance as clearly known by Reason, as of Qualities by Sensation.
- Particular Substances distinguish'd only by their known Qualities.
- What we call the Nature of Substances is only their Properties, tho' we have no Ideas of fome of them.
- Primary Qualities don't constitute Complex Ideas, because rarely known.
- Secundary Qualities, what.
- The third fort of Ideas, which in this Author's account goes to the making the Complex Ideas of Substances, are reducible to primary or secundary Qualities.
- The Senfible Qualities of Bodies would appear other than they do, if our Organs of Senfe were more acute than they are.
- Our Notion of a Spiritual Substance, as clear as of Corporcal.
- This excellently prov'd and explain'd by the Author in all the primary Properties of Spirits and Bodies compar'd.
- The Mode or Caufe of the Cahefion in Bodies as unintelligible as the Mode or Caufe of Thinking.
- Pressare of the Ambient Fluid not sufficient Cause of Coheston, explain'd at large.
- Communication of Motion as unconceivable, as by Thought.
- That all our Knowledge of Substances is gain'd by the Mind's uniting Simple

Ideas, no good inference from the Premifes, but rather the just contrary.

# C H A P. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

Collective Ideas what, and how form'd?

This Author and others differ in their account of the manner, how the Ideas of fingle and collective Substances are form'd, briefly explain'd.

### CHAP. XXV.

### Of Relation.

R Elation what, and the several forts. Several Observables in Relation.

### CHAP. XXVI.

Of Caufe and Effect.

CAufe and Effect what; Final, Effi. cient, Material, Formal Caufes, what properly.

- Cause and Effect only Names of Subfrances given them on the account of Properties conceiv'd in them.
- Simple Ideas or Qualities neither Caufes or Effects properly.

Creation, Vegetation, Making, Altering, how diftinguish'd.

Time, Place, Magnitude, capable of Relation, tho' the Words feem Positive, as appears by the Answers to Questions about them.

How to know what Relative.

Chap.

### CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diversity.

WW Hat kind of Relation is here inquir'd into.

- The feveral Reasons why commonly one thing is said to be the same with itself at different times.
- Why GOD the same with himself at all times.
- Why finite intelligent Substances the fame with them felves at different times.
- Why fingle corporeal Substances.

Why Modes.

- Why artificial Things.
- Why Vegetables.
- Why Animals.
- Why Men.
- Why Perfons.
- Why we Jay any Effect is Possible.
- This Author's Notions of the Several Sorts of Identity explain'd and examin'd ?
- Meer Existence not the Principium, Individuation is as this Author alledges.
- Identity of Vegetables don't require one common Principle of Life.
- Identity of Animals do require one common Principle of Life.

Identity of Man (omething more than Matter organiz'd in the fame manner; namely the fame Principle of its intellectual Actions.

- Two Objections of the Author's answered, being grounded upon imaginary Supposupposuppo-
- Perfonal Identity not meerly Confcioufnefs, prov'd by feveral Arguments, and his Objections answered.
- Two puzling Questions of the Author's answered, and his own Answers to them retorted.
- The Two Conditions requir'd by this Author for the answering the first Question unreasonable and triffing.

- His Salvo for the ill Consequences of that Doctrine insufficient.
- Arguments that Confciousness alone does not make the same Person, or want of it different Persons.
- The Author's Arguments that Confciousncis only makes the same or different Persons retorted.

The Conclusion.

This Author's acknowledgment of extravagant Suppolitions.

CHAP. XXVIII.

### Of Relations.

THE Several Sorts of Relations.

**Modal Relations.** 

Natural Relations.

- By Propriety.
- Artificial Relations or by Institution.
- Moral Relations.
- Divine and Humane Laws.
- No reason for the new Name of a Law of Reputation, and the Consequence thereof, if own'd?
- Virtue and Vice not meer Names, but resolvable into immutable Relations.
- Praise never reckon'd the same with Virtue, only call'd so, because the presumed Effect of Virtue.
- Virtue and Vice not meer Arbitrary Names.
- The Knowledge of no fort of Relation gain'd by compounding fimple Ideas; but by comparing Substances in their Modes, Actions and Properties.

### C H A P. XXIX

Of Clear and Obscure, distinct and confus'd Ideas.

HOW all that is meant by the Word Ideas may be better exprefs'd. What

What a clear Idea is, explain'd by a Similitude.

No Object properly Obscure in itself. How Notions became Obscure.

### CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaftical Ideas.

All fimple Ideas real; what Fantastical Ideas are. All fimple Ideas real; how far true. Complex Ideas not lefs real, the lefs perfect. The Notion of mixt Actions real, as well as fingle Qualities, the not in all Men equally perfect.

How Ideas of Substances may become Fantastical.

### C H A P. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

WW Hat Adequate and Inadequate Ideas are.

- Simple Ideas are Inadequate, as well as Complex, tho not fo much.
- The Notion of mix'd Modes adequate, tho not for the Reason this Author gives; but because not conformable to the true Standard in Moral Matters.
- Ideas of Substances never refer'd to real Essences, and thence this Author has made that obscure which is plain.

### C H A P. XXXII.

True and Falle Ideas.

TRuth or Falfhood only belongs to Propositions tacitly form'd in the Mind, or put into Words. Metaphysical Truth is only Existence.

Simple Apprehensions become true or falle, only when put into Propositions.

- Notions of mixt Actions become true or falfe as they agree to or disagree with a Rule, and that Rule is as fix'd as that for Substances.
- Every Man's Idea of Substances is conformable to bis own Experience and fo far true.

# BOOK. III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language.

Hat is the Use of Words. The Original of Words no Proof that they signifie nothing else.

CHAP. II.

Of the Signification of Words,

NO Words signific any thing naturally.

CHAP. III.

Of General Words.

Most of our Words are general, but can't be avoided. General Words not Signs of general abstract Ideas.

What

What an abstract Idea is properly.
What therefore General Words areth e Signs of.
Genus and Species what.
The common Sense of the Word Effence.
How far it is true, that General Words are the Creatures of the Understanding.
Abstract Ideas not the Essence of any thing.
The distinction of Real and Nominal Essence.

Sence needless and confounding.

### CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

Why fingle Qualities or Ideas can't be defin'd. Two Reafons thereof according to the common

Opinion.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of Mix'd Modes and Relations.

M Ix'd Modes have in this Author's Account Two Peculiarities worthy Obfervation. Mix'd Modes are no more Creatures of the Under standing than Substances. The Author's first Objection answered. The Difference between Virtues and Vices, as cafily known as between Substances. His fecond Argument answered. His third Argument answered.

### CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Substances.

THE Effence of Substances are Properties by which they are distinguished from each other.

Nothing is Effential in the proper Senfe of the Word Effence, but to Individuals.

That farther clear'd from the Author's Objections.

The occasion of that common Mistake, that nothing is effential to Individuals.

The true Boundaries of Substances are the Properties in them, not our Abstract Ideas of them.

Objections of the Author's answered.

- Properties belong to Individuals, not to Species or the General Names.
- Names are alterable at every ones pleasure, but not the Effence or Properties.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

WW Hat Particles of Speech are the Signs of. Particles used in aifferent Senses, but easily learnt by Practice, though not by Rules.

### CHAP. VIII.

Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

Hat are Concrete and what Abstract Terms. Concrete Terms the Names of Substances. Abstract Terms the Names of Qualities or Properties. The true Reasons why Abstract Terms are not Predicates of Propositions. Few abstract Names of Substances and why. C H A P.

#### СНАР ІХ.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

Two uses of words.

- Four ways by which words become doubtful, affigned by this Author.
- The common reasons of doubtfulness in the signification of words explained particularly.
- Doubtfulness in the Signification of Words, often chargeable upon the difference of Perfons Opinions or experience, not on the words themselves.
- Doubtfulness in the fence of Moral words chargeable upon prejudice, rather than the words.
- The standard of Moral Actions and their Names as well fixed as of the Names of Substances or particular Qualities.
- An Objection of the Author's answered.
- The signification of moral Names no more doubtful than of Substances.
- The doubtfulness of the Signification of Moral Words chargeable upon Hastiness or Humour, more than on the Words themselves.
- This Author's Observation of the doubtfulness of Moral Words carried too far.
- Names given to Subfances and mixed Modes according to Perfons experience, not by comparing them with general Abstract Ideas.

This farther cleared at large.

- The Reasons why this Author charges the doubtfulness of Words on the Words themselves, rarather than on differences between Persons using them, not good.
- Moderation, though a great Virtue, does not extend to oblige us to fix no certain Sense on the Holy Scriptures or other Antient Writings.

#### СНАР. Х.

Of the Abuse of Words.

THE defect of words not perfectly curable. How words are wilfully abused. It is impossible to correct all the abuse of words. words are not abused by references to abstract

- Ideas or real Essences. Nature works regularly, but naming things is
- indeed arbitrary.

### СНАР. ХІ.

Of the Remedy of the foregoing Imperfections and Abules.

Our Rules for the preventing the abuse of words, explained.

This Author's conceipt about Demonstration in Morality explained by an inflance, and proved useles.

Very useful directions by this Author for our improvement in the Knowledge of Substances. &c.

# BOOK. IV.

#### CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

W Hat Knowledge is. The Author's definition of Knowledge, and examined. Farther explained in particulars. What Knowledge of Identity and Diversity is. What relative Knowledge is. What relative Knowledge is. What Knowledge of Coexistence is. What Knowledge of Existence is. Knowledge meerly in Idea of no use; prov'd. It's impossible to prove the real Existence of any thing by the way of Ideas only. This the Reason why these Principles chargeable with Scepticism, in general.

Knowledge Actual or Habitual.

#### СНАР. И.

Of the Degrees of Knowledge.

Three Degrees of Knowledge affigned by this Author.

Intuitive Knowledge.

Intuitive Knowledge not real, but on the Suppolition of the Truth of our Senses.

No Proposition true or false, but on Supposition of the Existence of things without us, and of the Truth of our Senses.

what Demonstrative Knowledge is.

- Demonstrative Knowledge of no use meerly in Idea.
- Demonstrative Knowledge neither so easie or clear as Intuitive, and why:

This Anthor's Inference against Preconcessions and Precognition, not good.

- Some things must be Prefuppoled in all Certainty or Knowledge, whether Intuitive or Demonstrative.
- Some things may be as certain as Mathematical Demonstrations, and yet not by Ideas; an Instance.
- why no Demonstration in Smells, &c.
- Demonstration might be more easie and useful than meerly in Figure, and why.

Sensitive Knowledge what.

- This is really the Foundation of Intuitive and Demonstrative Knowledge.
- All Knowledge is grounded upon the Supposition of the Truth of our Senses, and other Faculties; explained.

Knowledge not always clear, tho the Ideas are.

### CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

- HOW far Knowledge or Certainty extends. This Author's Inference from those Premises, that matter may think, particularly examin'd.
- This Author's way of arguing on this point not fair.
- The Question about Matters Thinking fairly stated.

Matter does not Think.

- The fame Arguments which prove GOD is not Matter, prove our Souls are not matter; explained?
- Extent of Knowledge examined in the 4 Particulars before mentioned :

1. Identity.

- No Man himself thinks any Proposition true, but on his own Supposition of the real Existence of that whereof he thinks.
- 2. Knowledge of Coexistence.
- No Knowledge of Substances in this Author's account.
- His meaning therein explained ?
- Every ones Knowledge of Substances extends as far as his Experience, and so far is as certain as Intuitive and Demonstrative.
- 3. Relative Knowledge.
- Knowledge of Relation very improveable indeed, but not in Ideal Relations only.
- Demonstration in Morality of little or no use, and why.
- This Author owns Demonstration in Morality not to be hoped for, and why.

4. Knowledge of Existence.

The Causes of Ignorance.

- I. Want of Ideas.
- The true reason of Ignorance well explained by this Author in two particulars.
- 2d. Reason of Ignorance want of discoverable Connexion.

Knowledge in Mathematical Matters either no better than Verbal, or Mutable.

3d. Cause of Ignorance, want of tracing Ideass explained.

Abstract Mathematicks not fo ujeful as generally eficemed.

#### CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

This Author's own Objections against the Reality of Knowledge according to his Principles.

His own Answer to those Objections examined.

The Conformity between Ideas, and the things of which they are the Ideas, not discoverable by his Principles.

- No Ideas real, on my Author's Principles.
- As to Simple Ideas, there are none fuch.

As to Complex I deas of mixed Modes, none fuch.

The Author's Evasion, retorted.

This farther urged by the Author and answer'd. Another Objection answered.

An Evalion of the Authors not confistent.

Why no real Knowledge of Substances, according to his Principles.

All Knowledge whatever is of Subflances, Modes and their Relations.

The Milunderstanding in this whole Matter cleared.

All the Confusion is from his new Sense of Words. The Instance of Changelings consider'd. The Instance of Monstrous Births consider'd?

Recapitulation.

(C)

#### CHAP. V.

#### Of Truth in General.

W Hat Truth is in the Author's Account. The common Definition of Truth.

The differences between the two Definitions of Truth, at large explained.

why it's hard to treat of Mental Propositions explained.

Mental Propositions explained by an instance of the Author's.

Demon-

Demonstration can never be meerly by Ideas. An Objection of the Author's answered by himself, but not fully.

The Idea of a Centaur is as capable of Existence as of Man (that is) neither of them are at all capable. Conclusion.

### CHAP. VI.

Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

W Hat Universal Propositions are. Universal Propositions may be formed without words; explained.

Certainty either of Truth or Knowledge.

- General Propositions may be as certainly known to be true, about Substances, as Mathematical Propositions.
- The word Triangle is a common Name, just as Gold is.

Two good Reafons of this Anthor's why we can't know all the Properties of Substances ; explained.

#### CHAP. VII.

#### Of Maxims.

Hat is commonly meant by Maxims. The Certainty of them, or any other Propositions, cannot be known by this Author's way of Ideas. AllObjections against them and their use clear'd.

#### CHAP. VIII.

#### Of Trifling Propolitions.

W Hat this Author calls such, proved not such; but are the most useful zexplained particularly.

#### CHAP. IX.

of our Knowledge of Existence.

E sfences of things don't concern Existence; explained.

- Effences are not Ideas; explained in all particulars.
- Effences in Natural things not made by us.
- Effences do concern Existence; the not owned fo by this Author.

General Propositions concern real Existence. Particular Propositions suppose Existence.

- Existence of things is known, but not meerly by Ideas.
- The Existence of GOD, known, but not by the way of Ideas.

### СНАР. Х.

Of our Knowledge of the Existence of GOD.

- THE Author's Argument to prove the Existence of GOD.
- That Argument would have all its force without going to the Notion of Eternity.
- St. Paul's Argument the beft.
- Two Arguments against it answered :
- This Author's Argument to prove that Matter cannot Think, or produce Thought, explain'd and unanswerable.
- The whole force of the Author's Argument to prove the Existence of GOD, put into the form of a Syllogism, and unanswerable, upon supposition of the Truth of our Senses and other Faculties; but not else.
- The Effects of Wildom and Power in all parts of the world confirm the belief of GOD's Existence.
- The Powers of our own Minds confirm it.
- The force of every one of this Author's Propositions enervated, by refolving all Certainty meerly into Ideas; particularly explained. The Conclusion.

### CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of Existence of other things.

- T is impossible to come to the Knowledge of our own, or GOD's Existence or the Truth of any Propositions whatever, without Supposing or Proving the real Existence of things without us.
- All the Arguments used by this Author to prove the Existence of things without us, and Truth of our Senjes, suppose the very Question; explained distinctly.
- His way of convincing the Sceptick supposes the Question.
- The Certainty of ourSenles the Foundation of all Knowledge.
- The Testimony of our Senses, not always limited to actual Sensation for the proving Truth.
- Conclusion. Two fort of Propositions knowable but neither of them, but upon supposition of the truth of our Senses, and real Existence of things without us. Chap.

### CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

- THE wfe of Maxims not fairly represented by this Author.
- The Use of them fairly represented.
- The Author's Questions about the use of Maxims answered?
- The Author's Representation of the danger of Principles not just.
- <sup>°</sup>Tis as dangerous to deny all Principles, as to embrace false Principles.
- This Author's Propofal for gaining Certainty without any Principles or Presuppositions examined, and proved to be either the old Method in a new Dress of Words, or needless.
- The old Method of gaining Knowledge in Moral Matters explained two ways.
- why the Clearness of Mathematical Demonstrations not immitable in Morality, truly represented.
- The way of Improvement in Natural Philosophy much the same with that in Morality evinced.
- <sup>o</sup>Tis fafer to go upon the common principles on which all Mankind have agreed, than offer to doubt of every thing.
- This Author's Cantions against Hypotheses in Natural Philosophy very good; but now-adays almost needles.
- Conclusion. Experimental Philosophy useful, though it cannot make our Knowledge of substances adequate.
- Mathematical Demonstrations, when applied to Particulars for Use, not so absolutely certain as generally believed; this explained.

### CHAP. XIII.

Some farther Confiderations concerning our Knowledge.

NOT wholly voluntary, or wholly involuntary.

#### CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

How Judging commonly defined. How defined by this Author. The Difference between the Definitions. CHAP. XV.

### Of Probability.

HE Bounds of Certainty, as affigned by this Author examined in the Particulars Knowable.

- We can't fo much as know or be certain of our own Existence, nor our own Perceptions, nor General Propositions, nor the Existence of God, nor the Existence of things without us, nor the Truth of Mathematical Propositions meerly by Ideas.
- Probability defined by this Author.
- The Notation of the Word Probable too much limited by this Author, though often taken in his Sense of it.
- That may be certain to one, which is only probable to another, and improbable to a Third Perfon.
- Faith, Believing or a senting, may be on as certain Grounds as any fort of Knowledge; and therefore those words too much limited by this Author.
- The Grounds of Probability.
- what makes Testimony of others more or less credible.
- Before Affent the Grounds of Probability (bould be examined in Matters of Importance.
- The Opinion of others, though no Ground of Certainty, yet it may be of Probability; explained, why.

#### CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Affent :

HE Evils of Scepticism and wrong Principles compared ?

Probability of Two forts, or in Two Cafes.

- Three Degrees of Probability as good as Certainty, and Instances given by the Author to explain it.
- The Cases in which Judgment is most necessary.
- Traditional Testimony, the less valid the farther from the Original, proved not always true.
- Analogy the only Rule of Probability in things that don't occur to the Senfes.
- Miracles not the less credible for being contrary to common Experience.
- Revealed Propositions may be certain because attested by GOD.

This Point not fully explained by this Author. How commonly Perfons fatisfy themselves of the Certainty of Divine Revelation.

Eye-witnesses of Miracles may be alcertained in their Faith

Such as were not Eye witneffes may be as certain as of any thing elfe they did not fee.

Such a Certainty leaves no Ground for a rational Difbelief or Doubt.

CHAP. XVII.

#### Of Reafon.

HE several Significations of that word. The Author treats of it here only as a Faculty.

The Necessity of this Eaculty.

- This Faculty cannot be exercised without Presuppositions.
- The Autbor's Definition of Reason.

The Vulgar Definition of Reason.

The Difference between the Definitions explain'd.

All the Author's Arguments against the Usefulness of Syllogisms answered.

where Reason fails.

Neither Intuitive nor Demonstrative Knowledge real, without Supposition of things really existing without us.

Rational Knowledge farther extended than the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas.

- Judgment of larger Extent than affigned by this Author.
- Four forts of Arguments commonly used. The Particulars explained; and not fo useless as he represents them.
- It cannot be proved meerly by Ideas, what things are according to, above, or contrary to Reason.
- Another Sense of the word Realon, as opposed to Faith, very properly affign'd by this Author.

### CHAP. XVIII.

Of Faith and Reafon and their diffinct Provinces.

This Author's Definitions of Faith and Realon, and the common Definitions of them compared.

- several Observations of this Author examined and explained.
- No need of either new or old Simple Ideas in order to Supernatural Knowledge:
- Traditional Knowledge not jo sertain as Imme-

- diate Revelation or Rational Deductions, and why. But this must be limited to Traditional Revelation only.
- No Revelation against clear Reason, and why 3 but this Author's Reasons not so plain or convincing.
- An Inference thence of the Author's examined. A Caution relating to the Holy Scriptures.
- Rational Faith and Divine Faith only differ in Degrees of Evidence, not always in the Matter.
- The Use of Reason and Humane Testimony doth not make a Proposition the less credible.
- The Difference between immediate and mediate Divine Revelation explained by a Comparifon. 'Tis fo fmall as to make no Difference at all in the Ground or Reafon of Humane Actions.
- what things are properly Matters of Faith when revealed.
- No clear Account given by this Author, nor can be by his Principles, why we (bould think any Reveal d Proposition certain; because we can never be certain that it was reveal d.

How this is commonly stated, or why Revealed Propositions may be certainly known to be true.

### CHAP. XIX.

Of wrong Affent or Error.

F Our Reasons of Error assigned by the Author, and explain'd distinctly, and as large. A Material Question started by the Author, about the Ignorance of several Persons, and in several Countries, in Matters of Religion; but not fully answered by him, or can indeed by his Principles.

How that Question is answerable by others.

The Conclusion. The Author's new way for preventing Errors, summarily review'd, and proved insufficient in all forts of Cases and Propositions.

How others that don't go upon these Ideal Principles, satisfy themselves in the Certainty of Propositions, explained particularly and distinctly.

### СНАР. ХХ.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

A N Explication of the Anthor's Method of improving Knowledge, and his Scheme particularly for Logicks.