

CONTENTS

PREFACE	xiii
I. THE GENERIC STRUCTURE OF INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION	I
1. Aims and Objectives	I
2. Aspects of Methodology: Teleology	2
3. Aspects of Methodology: Generality	5
4. The Critical Evaluation of Methods and the Dynamics of Methodological Progress	6
5. The Darwinian Dimension	8
6. Prospect	11
II. THE PRAGMATIC ROOTS OF FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE	12
1. The Acceptance Model of Knowledge	12
2. The Problem of Legitimation for Cognitive Methods: The <i>Diallelus</i>	15
3. Cognitive Teleology: The Dual Aspect of Theory and Practice	18
4. The Pragmatic Turn	23
III. THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO COGNITIVE JUSTIFICATION	25
1. The Pragmatic Justification of Cognitive Methodology	25
2. The Problem of Circularity: Plausible Presumptions as a Way Out	26
3. The Problem of Attributability: <i>Post Hoc</i> and <i>Propter Hoc</i>	29
4. Hume's Problem	32
5. The Structure of the Pragmatic Justification of a Cognitive Method	35

IV.	DEFICIENCIES OF THESIS PRAGMATISM	37
	1. The Nature of Thesis Pragmatism	37
	2. Pragmatic Utility as a Test of Acceptability	40
	3. The Machinery of Utility Assessment	47
	4. The Claims of Pragmatism and the Link Between Utility and Truth	48
	5. The "Illogical" Nature of Utility	50
	6. The Roots of the Difficulty	54
	7. A Variant Form of Thesis Pragmatism: Peirce's Theory of Truth	57
	Appendix: A Cautionary Tale and its Lessons	62
	1. The Tale	62
	2. The Lessons	64
V.	METHODOLOGICAL PRAGMATISM	66
	1. The Methodological Approach to Cognition	66
	2. The Methodologically Pragmatic Validation of Knowledge	69
	3. The Inherent Generality of the Methodological Approach	72
	4. The Aspect of Rationality	74
	5. How the Present Methodological Approach Contrasts With That of Peirce	77
	6. Hegelian Ramifications	78
VI.	WHY RELATE SUCCESS AND TRUTHFULNESS?	81
	1. The Basic Problem	81
	2. The Inherent Generality of Methodological Success	81
	3. Generality Blunts Some Objections	82
	4. The Metaphysical Rationale: I	83
	(i) Activism	84
	(ii) Reasonableness	85
	(iii) Interactionism: Feedback, Sensitivity, Vulnerability	86

5. The Metaphysical Rationale: II	87
6. Putting the Pieces Together: The Metaphysical Deduction	89
7. The Desirability and Feasibility of a Metaphysical Deduction	92
 VII. CLOSING THE CIRCLES	 99
1. Is the Proposed Validation Viciously Circular?	99
2. The Figure-Eight Structure of the Rationale of Legitimation	106
3. Pragmatic Efficacy Affords a "Reality Principle"	107
4. The Problem of Underdetermination	110
5. Epistemic Stratification	113
6. Presumptions	114
7. Presumptions Implicit in Regulative Principles	116
8. The Need for Presumptions	118
9. Presumptions and the Avoidance of Circularity	121
10. The Precedent of Peirce	123
 VIII. EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY	 126
1. Background	126
2. A Metaphysical Rationalization of the Link Between Darwinian Survival and Pragmatic Adequacy	129
3. Rational Selection	133
4. The Special Case of Cognitive Methodology	135
5. Thesis Darwinism vs. Method Darwinism	140
 IX. A CRITIQUE OF THESIS DARWINISM	 146
1. Popper's Evolutionary Epistemology	146
2. Comparison with Methodological Darwinism	156
3. Removal of an Objection	160
4. The Role of Trial and Error	162
5. Transition to Scientific Method	166

X.	AUTONOMY, SELF-CORRECTIVENESS, AND THE CREDENTIALS OF SCIENCE	167
	1. Does Science Lead to Truth?	167
	2. The Self-Correction Thesis and the Autonomy of Science	168
	3. The Truthfulness of Scientific Theses and the Nature of Scientific Progress	171
	4. The Self-Correctiveness of Science and the Foundations of its Claims to Cognitive Adequacy	175
	5. The Copernican Inversion and the Role of Presumption	178
	6. Cognitive Progress: Its Presumptive and Regulative Aspect	181
	7. Scientific Progress and the Problem of Continuity	184
XI.	THE LEGITIMACY OF DEFEASIBLE KNOWLEDGE	189
	1. Defeasibility and the Role of Presumption	189
	2. Knowledge Claims and the Issue of Certainty	191
	3. The Tenability of Cognitive Fallibilism	197
	4. Summary	199
XII.	A REBUTTAL OF SCEPTICISM	201
	Preliminaries	201
	I. BURDEN OF PROOF	
	1. The Legal Aspect	201
	2. The Disputational Aspect	204
	3. The Expository Aspect	207
	4. Presumptions and the Structure of Burden of Proof	208
	5. Presumptions and the Conception of a "Prima Facie" Case	215

6.	The Locus of Presumption	217
	(1) Law	217
	(2) Disputation	218
	(3) Debate	218
	(4) Theory of Knowledge	218
7.	The Epistemological Aspect: Rationality	220
	II. SCEPTICISM	
8.	Scepticism and Rationality	221
9.	Scepticism and the Demands of Rationality	225
10.	Scepticism and the Methodological Turn	228
11.	The Crucial Shift of Presumption at the Level of Practice	230
XIII.	THE PROBLEM OF ALTERNATIVE LOGICS	235
	1. Pluralism in Logic	235
	2. The Problem of Choice	237
	3. The Geometric Analogy: A False Start	239
	4. The Grammatical Analogy	242
	5. Absolutism and Relativism in Logic	245
XIV.	THE INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATION OF LOGIC	250
	1. The Instrumental Turn: Logic as Doctrine vs. Logic as Instrument	250
	2. The Pragmatic Limits of Pluralism	252
	(i) Regulative Feasibility	253
	(ii) Functional Suitability	254
	3. A Closer Look at the Functional/Regulative Aspect	256
	4. The Systematization of Logic and its Instrumental Justification	259
	5. The Evolutionary Aspect	265
	6. Can One Expect Uniqueness?	267
	7. The "Priority" of Classical Logic	269
	8. Conclusion	271

XV. THE DIALECTICAL INTERRELATION OF FORMAL AND FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE	272
1. The Orientation of the Instrumental Justification of Logic	272
2. The Structure of the Interrelationship	274
3. Quine's Pragmatic Validation of Logic	277
XVI. LIMITS OF THE THEORY	285
1. The Feasibility of "Knowledge for Knowledge's Sake"	285
2. A Purported Danger in Stressing <i>Praxis</i>	288
3. Limits of the Pragmatic Approach	290
XVII. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATIST THOUGHT	295
NAME INDEX	309
SUBJECT INDEX	313