

# Contents

List of Figures and Tables	ix
Preface	xi
<b>Part I. Why Study White-Collar Crime Legislation?</b>	<b>1</b>
<i>Chapter 1. Questions, Introduction to the Case, and Overview</i>	<i>3</i>
From Push to Pull: A Short History of the Legislative Process	5
Outline of the Book: Theory and Research	7
<b>Part II. Theory and Methods in the Study of White-Collar Crime Legislation</b>	<b>11</b>
<i>Chapter 2. Rationalities, Communication, and Power: Theoretical Perspectives and Methods</i>	<i>13</i>
Mapping the Theoretical Field	14
Rationalities in Action and Structural Conditions	26
Methods of Research: Documents, Interviews, and Cognitive Maps	27
<b>Part III. The Case Study: From Claims Making to Legislation</b>	<b>31</b>
<i>Chapter 3. The Social Problem of Economic Crime, Claims Making, and Motivating the Political Process</i>	<i>33</i>
Conditions for Economic Crime, Control Agencies, and Measurement	33

**x    Figures and Tables**

Table 15.	Complexity of maps for relatively unprepared statements	126
Table 16.	Maps expressing positive impacts of criminalization by political party and administration	127

## **vi Contents**

Construction of the Economic Crime Problem in the Media	37
Construction of Economic Crime and the Legal Profession	46
The Emerging Intervention of Industry Associations (by Peter Brühl)	50
<i>Chapter 4. The Expert Commission: Developing the Claims and First Resistance</i>	53
Theoretical Considerations: Experts, Knowledge, and Rationality	53
Participation of Experts in the Law-Making Process: Structure and Dynamics of Participation	56
Industry, Experts, and Antitrust Law (by Peter Brühl)	82
Preliminary Conclusions on Experts: Primacy and Autonomy of Criminal Justice	85
<i>Chapter 5. The Production of the Second Law Against Economic Crime: The Political Sector</i>	87
Functionality and Social Action in the Political Sector	87
From the Justice Department to the Legislature	89
The Legislative Process	90
The Ministerial Phase	92
The Industrial Lobby and Criminal Justice Legislation (by Peter Brühl)	93
Industry and the Executive Branch: Preliminary Conclusions (by Peter Brühl)	102
Parliamentary Decision Makers: Deliberations in the Judicial Committee of the <i>Bundestag</i>	104
The Outcome of the Legislation: Structure and Selection	113
After the Second Law: Negotiated Implementation	117
<i>Chapter 6. Context Structures, Situations, and Argument Structures: The Total Set of Cognitive Maps</i>	120
<b>Part IV. Conclusions from the Case Study and an American-German Comparison</b>	129
<i>Chapter 7. Rationalities, Communication, and Power: Conclusions</i>	131
Interests and Rationalities	135

Conflict and Consensus	136
Communication and Power	137
<i>Chapter 8. The American and German Cases: Commonalities and Differences</i>	139
Claims Making and Social Movement in the United States: Public, Moral Entrepreneurs, and Centralized Response	140
Conclusions: Commonalities, Divergences, and Theory	154
References	163
Index	173

# Figures and Tables

Figure 1.	The legislative process	6
Figure 2.	Role of the expert commission	58
Figure 3.	Positions and votes in the expert commission	67
Figure 4.	Positions of commission members on the Criminalization Scale	69
Figure 5.	Cognitive map of economic law professor U	71
Figure 6.	Cognitive map of criminal law professor T	74
Figure 7.	Cognitive map of Representative B	108
Figure 8.	Cognitive map of Representative C	109
Figure 9.	Cognitive map of Representative D	110
Figure 10.	Cognitive map of Representative A	111
Figure 11.	Cognitive map of Representative E	112
Table 1.	Claims-making articles versus economic behavior	39
Table 2.	Victims according to media versus court statistics	41
Table 3.	Types of offenses by punitiveness of demands	43
Table 4.	Types of demands by claims makers, <i>Die Zeit</i>	44
Table 5.	Experts in the law-making process by sector	62-63
Table 6.	Expert commission: members and structure	64-65
Table 7.	Purposive rationality of experts	77
Table 8.	Substantive rationalities of experts	80-81
Table 9.	Distribution of concepts by types of decision makers and social spheres	106
Table 10.	Types of cognitive maps	122
Table 11.	Complexity of maps by preparedness	123
Table 12.	Complexity of maps by government branch	124
Table 13.	Complexity of maps by majority/minority	125
Table 14.	Complexity of maps for relatively prepared statements	125