

Contents

Preface

page xi

I An Eighteenth-century Innovation in the Concept of Meaning

1 Can meanings change?	1
2 Meanings as unchangeable properties	3
3 Meanings as changeable properties	9
4 Meanings as changing continuants	14

II Meanings Conceived as what Words have in a Language or Culture

5 <i>De facto</i> and <i>de jure</i> theories of meaning	24
6 The implications of changeability	29
7 Meanings in a language	56
8 Meanings in a culture	72
9 Can a language be a prison?	82

III Meanings Conceived as Topics for Philosophical Investigation

10 What room is there for a specifically philosophical study of meanings?	95
11 The doctrine of logical grammar	99
12 The critique of good sense	109

IV The Concept of Meaning in the Problem of Universals

13 The problem conceived as insoluble	128
14 The problem conceived as soluble	131
15 How should the problem be conceived?	140

V Meanings Conceived as what are Understood in an Act of Communication

16	Meanings, uses and subsistent entities	page 143
17	The meaning of a remark in a particular language	149
18	The meaning of a remark in any language	154
19	Do propositions exist?	161

VI Meaning and the *a Priori*

20	Are all <i>a priori</i> truths analytic?	173
21	Is analytic truth a matter of degree?	182
22	Can meaning be the method of verification?	187

VII Meaning and the Law of Extensionality

23	The problem of non-extensional discourse	192
24	Why is Frege's distinction insufficient?	193
25	The problem of non-extensionality as a problem about statement-forming operators on sayings	201
26	The problem of semantical antinomies in the systematized logic of statements about statements	212
27	An extensional formalization of informally non-extensional contexts	221
28	A formalization for the general logic of non-assertive sayings	228
29	The problem of quantification into non-extensional contexts	232
30	A non-extensional formalization of informally non-extensional contexts	236

VIII Meanings Conceived as Topics for Formal-logical Investigation

31	What do logical formulas represent?	249
32	How is logical theory justified?	262
33	Does logic deny the possibility of an empty universe?	275

IX Meaning and Vagueness

34	Arguments from universal vagueness to universal indeterminacy	<i>page</i> 286
35	The truism of universal vagueness	288
36	The fallacy of universal indeterminacy	291

X The Concept of Meaning in the Problem of Natural Necessity

37	Is there a satisfactory theory of natural necessity?	298
38	Natural necessity conceived as a form of <i>a priori</i> truth	316
39	Inductive confirmation conceived as the precisification of hypotheses	332
40	Inductive inconclusiveness as a corollary of changeability of meaning	342

Appendix A	355
-------------------	-----

Appendix B	359
-------------------	-----

Index	361
--------------	-----