
Contents

Preface	XI
Introduction	1
1 Content, belief and belief attributions	7
1.1 Introduction	7
1.2 Possible world semantics	9
1.3 The description theory of reference	11
1.4 The description theory of reference and externalism	14
1.5 The pragmatic account of intentionality	20
1.6 Intentionality: the causal/informational account	22
1.7 Combining the pragmatic and causal accounts	25
1.8 Context dependence: two-dimensional semantics	28
1.9 Solving problems by diagonalisation	33
1.10 Self-locating beliefs	37
1.10.1 The problem of self-locating beliefs	37
1.10.2 Fine grained possibilities	38
1.10.3 Stalnaker's solution	41
1.11 Belief, and <i>de dicto</i> belief attributions	45
1.11.1 Diagonalisation and aboutness	45
1.11.2 Diagonalisation and partly linguistic beliefs	49
1.11.3 Diagonalisation and proper names	52
1.12 De <i>re</i> belief attributions	57
1.12.1 Quine's problem	57
1.12.2 Externalism and Counterpart theory	63
1.12.3 Counterpart theory	64
1.13 Info states, counterparts, and diagonalisation	67
2 Referential and Descriptive Pronouns	71
2.1 Introduction	71
2.2 Some classical approaches to anaphora	73
2.3 A referential analysis of anaphoric pronouns	76

VIII Contents

2.4	Comparison with standard dynamic semantics	85
2.5	Discourse referents and diagonalisation	87
2.5.1	Unclear reference and successful communication	87
2.5.2	Bridging the gap by diagonalisation	88
2.5.3	The status of possibilities and discourse referents	91
2.6	Referential descriptions and propositional concepts	98
2.7	Epistemic <i>might</i>	103
2.8	Descriptive pronouns	106
2.9	Plurals, quantifiers, and functional pronouns	116
2.10	Donkeys and the specificity of indefinites	122
3	Intentional Identity	127
3.1	Introduction	127
3.2	The problem of intentional identity	128
3.3	Asymmetry explained by descriptive approaches	131
3.3.1	Cross-speaker anaphora	132
3.3.2	Intentional identity	134
3.4	Problems for descriptive approaches	137
3.4.1	Cross-speaker anaphora	137
3.4.2	Intentional identity	138
3.5	Speaker's reference	140
3.6	Speaker as responsible for asymmetry	143
3.7	Belief objects and externalism	145
3.8	Conclusion	145
4	Presupposition Satisfaction	147
4.1	Introduction	147
4.2	Standard Implementation	149
4.3	Presupposition as a propositional attitude	149
4.3.1	Motivation	149
4.3.2	Formalization	152
4.4	Quantification and anaphora	155
4.4.1	The binding problem	155
4.4.2	Anaphora	156
4.5	No cancellation or local accommodation	157
4.5.1	Denials	158
4.5.2	Modal subordination	159
4.6	Conclusion	161
5	Conditionals and belief change	163
5.1	Introduction	163
5.2	The Lewis/Stalnaker analysis of conditionals	164
5.3	The Ramsey test analysis	169
5.4	The Bayesian approach	172
5.5	Triviality	176

5.6	Reactions to triviality	177
5.6.1	Imaging versus epistemic revision	178
5.6.2	Van Fraassen	179
5.6.3	Two kinds of belief change	180
5.6.4	Adams	181
5.6.5	Lewis	182
5.6.6	The preservativity principle	183
5.6.7	Gibbard	185
5.6.8	A unified account	186
5.7	Harper's principle and iterated revision	187
5.8	Gibbard's problem revisited	190
5.9	Subjunctive conditionals again	193
5.10	Invalidity as illegitimate change of context	196
5.11	The systematicity of context change	198
5.12	A variable strict conditional account	199
5.13	Change of selection function	203
5.14	Conclusion	205
6	Some other attitudes	207
6.1	Introduction	207
6.2	Evidential attitudes and plausibility	208
6.2.1	Plausibility	208
6.2.2	Evidential verbs	209
6.2.3	Knowledge	211
6.2.4	Be surprised	216
6.3	Doubt	218
6.4	Desire	220
6.4.1	A Hintikka-style analysis	221
6.4.2	Desire as <i>ceteris paribus</i> preference	223
6.4.3	Desire as quantitative preference	224
6.4.4	A conditional analysis of desires	226
6.4.5	Buletic ordering	227
6.4.6	Combining belief revision and desirability	228
6.4.7	Intention and action	231
A	Two-dimensional counterpart theory	235
B	Context Change Theory	243
C	Pronouns as referential expressions	247
D	The Triviality result	253
	Bibliography	257
	Index	269