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# Contents

<b>Preface</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>1 Decision Theory and Human Behavior</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Beliefs, Preferences, and Constraints	4
1.2 The Rationality of Time Inconsistency	9
1.3 Bayesian Rationality and Subjective Priors	12
1.4 Preferences Are State-Dependent	16
1.5 The Behavioral Revolution	18
<b>2 Game Theory: Basic Concepts</b>	<b>33</b>
2.1 The Extensive Form	33
2.2 The Normal Form	36
2.3 Nash Equilibrium	38
2.4 Correlated Equilibrium	47
<b>3 Game Theory and Human Behavior</b>	<b>48</b>
3.1 Behavioral Game Theory	49
3.2 Character Virtues	76
3.3 The Situational Character of Preferences	78
3.4 The Dark Side of Altruistic Cooperation	79
3.5 Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation	81
<b>4 Rationalizability and Common Knowledge of Rationality</b>	<b>86</b>
4.1 Dominated and Iteratedly Dominated Strategies	87
4.2 Epistemic Games	94
4.3 Rationalizable Strategies	98
4.4 Common Knowledge of Rationality	100
<b>5 Extensive Form Rationalizability</b>	<b>106</b>
5.1 Backward Induction and Dominated Strategies	106
5.2 CKR Fails off the Backward Induction Path	113

5.3	How to Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma	114
5.4	Backward Induction and Extensive Form CKR	116
5.5	On the Inadmissibility of CKR	120
<b>6</b>	<b>The Logical Antinomies of Knowledge</b>	123
6.1	The Pitfalls of Naïve Epistemic Logic	123
6.2	The Common Knowledge of Logicality Paradox	124
6.3	The Surprise Examination	125
6.4	The Modal Logic of Knowledge	126
6.5	A Truth That Cannot Be Known	128
<b>7</b>	<b>The Mixing Problem: Purification and Conjectures</b>	131
7.1	The Incoherence of Mixed Strategies	131
7.2	Purifying Mixed Strategies	133
7.3	A Reputational Model of Honesty and Corruption	135
7.4	Epistemic Games: Mixed Strategies as Conjectures	138
<b>8</b>	<b>Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology</b>	142
8.1	The Sexes: From Battle to Ballet	143
8.2	The Choreographer Trumps Backward Induction	144
8.3	Convention as Correlated Equilibrium	146
8.4	The Social Epistemology of Common Priors	149
8.5	The Social Epistemology of Common Knowledge	151
8.6	Social Norms	153
8.7	Game Theory and the Evolution of Norms	153
<b>9</b>	<b>Common Knowledge and Nash Equilibrium</b>	156
9.1	Nash Equilibrium in Two-Player Games	156
9.2	The Modal Logic of Common Knowledge	159
9.3	The Commonality of Knowledge	162
9.4	The Demise of Methodological Individualism	171
<b>10</b>	<b>The Analytics of Human Sociality</b>	174
10.1	Explaining Cooperation: An Overview	174
10.2	The Folk Theorem	178
10.3	Cooperation with Private Signaling	186
10.4	One Cheer for the Folk Theorem	188
10.5	Altruistic Punishing in the Public Goods Game	190

10.6	The Failure of Models of Self-Regarding Cooperation	193
<b>11</b>	<b>The Unification of the Behavioral Sciences</b>	<b>194</b>
11.1	Gene-Culture Coevolution: The Biological Model	196
11.2	Biological and Cultural Dynamics	202
11.3	The Socio-Psychological Theory of Norms	204
11.4	Socialization and the Internalization of Norms	206
11.5	Varieties of Behavioral Modeling	207
11.6	Society as a Complex Adaptive System	215
11.7	The Behavioral Disciplines Can Be Unified	219
<b>12</b>	<b>Summary</b>	<b>221</b>
12.1	Game Theory	221
12.2	Commonality of Beliefs	221
12.3	The Limits of Rationality	222
12.4	Social Norms as Correlated Equilibria	222
12.5	Reason Is Bounded by Sociality, Not Irrationality	223
<b>13</b>	<b>Table of Symbols</b>	<b>224</b>
	<b>References</b>	<b>226</b>
	<b>Subject Index</b>	<b>254</b>
	<b>Author Index</b>	<b>258</b>