

Contents

<i>A Note on Sources</i>	xiii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xiv

PART I. THE NEW ETHIC VERSUS THE OLD: NIETZSCHE VERSUS 'MORALITY'

1 Introduction and Methodology	3
1.1 Overview of the book	3
1.2 Exegetical difficulties	7
2 Foundations: Nietzsche's Conception of Values	9
2.1 The nature and function of values	9
2.2 'Will'	13
2.3 'Power'	15
2.4 The historical determination of values	18
2.5 Affirming the necessity of history: the value of truth	23
2.6 Conclusion	25
3 'Life-Enhancement': Its Degrees and Types	26
3.1 'Life-enhancement': three criteria	26
3.2 Nietzsche's evaluation of values and concepts	36
3.3 Nietzsche's evaluation of the manner of valuing: 'masters' and 'slaves'	41
3.4 Is 'master/slave' coextensive with 'life-enhancement/life-denial'?	45
3.5 The scope of 'master' and 'slave' categories	49
3.6 'Master' and 'slave' as typology rather than history	51
3.7 Conclusion: 'good/bad' versus 'good/evil'	52
4 Non-moral versus Moral 'Guilt' and 'Bad Conscience'	55
4.1 Objectives and distinctions	55
4.2 The non-moral form of 'guilt' and of 'bad conscience'	57
4.3 The moral form of 'guilt' and of 'bad conscience'	70
4.4 Conclusions	74
Endnote: Outline of a model for guilt and shame	77

5	Asceticism in Life-Enhancement and Life-Denial	81
5.1	The 'ascetic conceptual form': a definition	81
5.2	Life-enhancing expressions of the ascetic form	83
5.3	Life-denying expressions: the ascetic ideal's structure and motives	88
5.4	Forcing truth to be a conditioned value	92
5.5	Is the ascetic ideal necessarily life-denying?	94
5.6	Why the 'transcendent' need not presuppose the ascetic ideal	96
5.7	In what sense is the ascetic ideal man's only meaning 'so far'?	99
5.8	Conclusion	102
6	The New Ideal: 'To become what one is'	104
6.1	The conception of morality rejected by Nietzsche: a summary	104
6.2	A life-enhancing ideal: 'to become what one is'	107
6.3	The 'sovereign individual'	116
6.4	'Eternal Return'	119
6.5	General claims in Nietzsche's ethics: the case of cruelty	126
6.6	Conclusion	134

PART II. FROM OLD TO NEW: NIETZSCHE'S REVALUATION OF THE VALUE OF TRUTH—A CASE STUDY

7	Scope of the Case Study	137
7.1	Why choose the value of truth?	137
7.2	Strategy for the case study	139
7.3	Nietzsche's conception of truth	139
7.4	Nietzsche's statements on the nature of truth	145
7.5	The empirical nature of Nietzsche's truth-claims	147
7.6	Nietzsche's talk of falsehood	149
7.7	Conclusion	149
8	The Unconditional Value of Truth: Nietzsche's Pioneering Critique	151
8.1	The value of untruth	152
8.2	The nihilism of the unconditional	155
8.3	The poverty of some truths	158

8.4	The elusiveness of truth about the 'deep' structure of reality; and the lost riches of the 'superficial'	158
8.5	The paralysing effects of reflective self-consciousness	160
8.6	The danger of premature self-knowledge	161
8.7	Truth out of error	161
8.8	Conclusion	163
9	The Unconditional Value of Truth: An Assessment of Nietzsche's Critique	165
9.1	Introduction	165
9.2	Knowledge and control over nature	166
9.3	Truth-telling and social relations	168
9.4	Life-enhancing Judaeo-Christian reasons for valuing truth	169
9.5	Conclusion	172
10	The Valuation of Truth in Nietzsche's Philosophy	175
10.1	Grounding Nietzsche's valuation of truth	177
10.2	<i>What</i> truths are valuable?	182
10.3	For <i>whom</i> is truth valuable?	186
10.4	<i>When</i> (over a lived life) is truth valuable?	190
10.5	Conclusion	193
	<i>Bibliography</i>	199
	<i>Index</i>	207